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Abstract 
Diversified business (or corporate) groups, consisting of legally independent firms 
operating in multiple markets, are ubiquitous in emerging markets and even in some 
developed economies. The study of groups, a hybrid organizational form between 
firm and market, is of relevance to industrial organization, corporate finance, 
development, economic growth and other domains of economic inquiry. This survey 
begins with stylized facts on groups around the world, and proceeds to a critical 
review the existing literature, which has focused almost entirely on groups as 
diversified entities and on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. 
Other schools of thought on the political economy of corporate groups, on groups and 
monopoly power, and on groups as networks are discussed next. We then proceed to 
promising, yet virtually unexplored, alternative lenses for viewing groups, for 
example, as quasi venture-capitalists or as family-based structures. The analysis 
points out important biases in the literature including the avoidance of a serious 
discussion of the origins of business groups, and the unfounded assumption that rent-
seeking is the only feasible political economy equilibrium in an interaction between 
groups and the government. We note that the empirical tendency to use recent data 
implies that the vast majority of studies exploit cross-sectional variation; the absence 
of (long) time-series data ensures that some conceptually important issues, such as 
how groups shape the environment in which they operate, receive relatively little 
attention. Lastly, we outline an agenda for future research. 
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I. Introduction 
Diversified business (or corporate) groups are ubiquitous in emerging markets 
(e.g. India and Pakistan, Brazil and Chile, Indonesia and Thailand, Korea, and many 
more), and even in some developed economies (e.g. Italy, Sweden). These groups 
typically consist of legally independent firms, operating in multiple markets, which 
are bound together by persistent formal and informal ties. Groups around the world 
vary considerably in form. In some, equity ties play a central role: among these, there 
are vertically-controlled groups (“pyramids”), and there are horizontally-linked 
groups, where cross shareholdings are important. In other business groups, in addition 
to formal (for example, equity) ties, informal ties are important: group firms can be 
related to each other through family and social ties, a common sense of identity, trade 
relations, and other dimensions. In certain countries, business groups are a politically 
important force; in others less so. And some groups are deeply involved in banking 
and financial services, whereas others are not. Nevertheless, operation across a large 
number of (often unrelated) industries (diversification), and family ownership 
combined with varying degrees of participation by outside investors are common 
characteristics of many business groups around the world.  
The study of business groups is fascinating for many reasons. Conceptually, 
this hybrid organizational form between firm and market can shed new light on the 
theory of the firm and its boundaries. Empirically, the ubiquity of business groups 
outside the US and the UK makes them relevant to a variety of fields within 
economics, including industrial organization, corporate finance, development and 
growth, and even open-economy macro, to the extent that it deals with financial 
crises. In most emerging markets there is hardly any economic investigation that can 
(or should) be carried out without reference to business groups and their impact. 
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Finally, the comparative study of business groups in emerging markets may shed new 
light on some economic phenomena in developed economies. For example, although 
many business groups are highly diversified, unlike American conglomerates each 
group firm is an independent entity, and the equity stake of outside investors can vary 
across group firms. Why are diversified entities in the US organized as conglomerates 
rather than business groups? Is the answer related to economic and financial 
development? Or is it perhaps due to differences in the rule of law, social structure, or 
political economy? The answers to these questions are yet unclear, but the questions 
are both important and exciting.     
The existing literature in economics and finance on business groups (and 
surveys of this literature such as Khanna, 2000, and Yafeh, 2003) has focused mostly 
on the implications of two characteristics of business groups. The first line of research 
views groups as diversified entities, and studies the relations between this feature and 
various questions in industrial organization and corporate finance. The second, more 
recent, line of research on business groups followed Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) 
survey on corporate governance and subsequent work by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998). 
Studies in this line of research regard business groups, especially their pyramidal 
forms, as a favorite setting for the study of conflicts of interests between controlling 
and minority shareholders; the latter’s expropriation is often referred to as 
“tunneling.”
1  
Other economic studies of groups emphasize rent seeking and the sometimes 
close relations between business groups and the governments of the countries in 
                                                            
1 The first reference to pyramids as a mechanism enabling control by a minority of shareholders dates 
back to Berle and Means (1932), Book I, Chapter V. The term “tunneling” has become popular 
following Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2000) who trace its origins to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in the Czech Republic. 
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which they operate. A smaller number of studies attempt to relate groups to monopoly 
power and imperfect competition.  
The literature on groups is not limited to economics and finance. Groups have 
attracted a lot of academic interest in sociology, where they are viewed as networks of 
social, not only economic, significance (e.g. Gerlach, 1992; Granovetter, 2005; 
Hamilton, 1997; Keister, 2004; Orrù et al., 1997). Studies of business groups are also 
common in business history, where the unit of analysis is typically the history of one 
group (e.g. Roberts, 1973, on the house of Mitsui; Steers, 1999, on the Hyundai 
group, and many more) or on groups in a single country (e.g. Amsden’s, 1989, study 
of Korea and its chaebol groups, or Piramal’s, 1998, study of Indian business houses). 
Going beyond the main schools of thought in the existing literature, we argue 
that there are several lenses, other than those of diversification and tunneling, through 
which groups can be usefully viewed and analyzed. For example, groups share 
structural features that are sometimes more in common with private equity investment 
firms than with conglomerates. Groups are also typically family firms; perhaps their 
behavior can be better understood from this perspective. These, hitherto virtually 
ignored, analogies might suggest valuable directions for future research.  
In general, we view the existing literature on groups as suggesting a menu of 
possibilities by which economic agents form business groups in response to the 
economic and institutional environment within which they operate. This view is in the 
spirit of work by Aoki (2001) or Greif (2005), who emphasize that institutions should 
be analyzed within a particular economic context. We also find that business groups 
are not unambiguously welfare reducing, in contrast with the impression one might 
get from much of the (recent) literature; they may sometimes play a positive role by 
making up for under-developed economic institutions. There is no clear verdict on the 
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extent to which groups are “paragons” or “parasites,” and the answer is likely to vary 
across countries and across groups.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present 
some stylized facts on groups around the world. Section III contains a critical review 
of the literature on business groups: diversification and sources of performance 
differences between group-affiliated and other firms are discussed first, and an 
evaluation of the literature on tunneling follows. We then move on to discuss the 
political economy of business groups, the surprisingly small literature on groups and 
monopoly power, and the economic sociology literature on groups as networks. In 
Section IV we turn to new perspectives through which groups might be usefully 
viewed, in particular, business groups as quasi-venture capitalists, and business 
groups as family firms, an approach which we regards as particularly promising. 
Section V adopts a more dynamic (and historical) view. Such a view can shed light on 
some of the puzzles which emerge out of contemporary, cross-sectional research. 
Second, while in a static analysis groups should be viewed as a response to their 
environment, in a dynamic context (which has so far been under-studied in the 
literature) groups can sometimes shape and influence the environment in which they 
operate. Section VI examines the extent to which the large literature on corporate 
groups in Japan is helpful in understanding business groups elsewhere. Finally, in 
Section VII we consider what we believe to be some of the most fruitful directions for 
future research on business groups.   
 
II. Basic Stylized Facts: Business Groups around the World  
This section provides basic, preliminary, stylized facts on the groups around 
the world, their prevalence, performance, and structure. This section does not report 
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any rigorous econometric tests, nor is it designed to prove or refute hypotheses about 
groups and the determinants of their performance; instead, the section illustrates the 
nature of firm-level data on business groups in emerging markets. 
Table I, which is reproduced from Khanna and Yafeh (2005), describes 
business groups in twelve emerging markets, as well as pre- and post-war Japan. The 
fraction of firms classified as group affiliated ranges from about a fifth in Chile to 
about two-thirds in Indonesia. These figures should be viewed as indicative, rather 
than as precise magnitudes – the number of firms classified as group affiliated firms 
can vary considerably across sources and definitions. For example, in Japan, members 
of Presidents’ Clubs (the largest core members of the six bank-centered groups) 
account for less than 10 percent of the firms; other group definitions (e.g. the one 
provided by Dodwell Marketing Consultants) are much more expansive and suggest 
that between one third and one half of all listed firms are group-affiliated (Weinstein 
and Yafeh, 1995; Yafeh, 2003).  
Table I also suggests that, with one exception (Turkey), in all countries group 
affiliated firms are larger than unaffiliated firms. Moving to measures of risk and 
return,  in three of the twelve countries, Brazil, Israel and the Philippines, groups 
exhibit what seems to be superior (unconditional) performance: high profitability and 
low risk relative to unaffiliated firms. In Chile, India and Mexico, the profitability of 
group-affiliated firms exceeds that of other companies, and so does their profit 
volatility. In the remaining six countries, a low standard deviation of operating 
profitability is accompanied by low profitability. Many of these differences, however, 
are not statistically significant, and more elaborate tests (discussed below), are needed 
to evaluate the determinants of success of group-affiliated firms. Nevertheless, casual 
observation of the figures in Table I suggests that, in many emerging markets group 
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affiliated firms out-perform other companies. This is in contrast with the literature on 
post-war Japan, where members of bank-centered Japanese groups have under-
performed otherwise comparable unaffiliated firms for many years (Caves and 
Uekusa, 1976; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Yafeh, 2003).  
Casual observation suggests also that the relative performance of group-
affiliated firms (the risk and return characteristics of business groups) cannot be easily 
related to the often-cited differences in legal origins across countries (La Porta et al., 
1997; 1998); in part, this may be due to the fact that groups evolve over time and legal 
origin does not. Other country-specific institutional characteristics, provided by the 
World Bank (Doing Business data set, see http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness) 
include, for example, information on the duration and cost of bankruptcy procedures 
as well as on the efficiency of contract enforcement. Yet it is hard to find common 
institutional features among the countries where group firms seem to do relatively 
well. For example, contract enforcement is relatively efficient in Israel and poor in the 
Philippines (Brazil is in between). Similarly, among the countries where group firms 
are characterized by low risk and low return, Korea ranks relatively high in contract 
enforcement and Argentina relatively low. 
As a second way to describe the risk and return profiles of group-affiliated 
firms around the world, Table II (which is also reproduced from Khanna and Yafeh, 
2005) reports the results of two simple regression specifications. Again, these should 
not be regarded as formal tests of specific hypotheses, but rather as data description 
exercises. In Column 1 the relation between group affiliation and the volatility of 
operating profitability is estimated for each country on the basis of Equation (1):  
(1) vprofi = constant + β0(assetsi ) + β1(profi) +β2(group dummy) + industry dummies,  
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where vprofi is the standard deviation of each firm’s operating profitability calculated 
over all years for which data are available (see Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, for details), 
assetsi is the firm’s average size (measured by assets), and profi is the firm’s average 
operating profitability. The group dummy variable equals one for firms affiliated with 
business groups. There is a negative and significant effect of groups on the standard 
deviation of operating profitability in four out of twelve emerging markets in the 
sample. With the exception of India, the group coefficients in the remaining seven 
countries are negative but insignificantly different from zero. There is evidence of low 
profit volatility in prewar Japan as well as among core members of the large bank-
centered corporate groups in postwar Japan. In the emerging markets where group 
affiliated firms do exhibit significantly lower profit volatility the magnitude of the 
difference is rather large. Group firms enjoy a standard deviation of operating 
volatility that is lower than the sample average (Column 2) by over 20 percent in 
Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan, and by about 30 percent in Brazil.  
Column 3 of Table II presents the results of regressions similar in spirit to 
those based on Equation (1), but with profitability (ROA) as the dependent variable, 
drawn from Khanna and Rivkin (2001).
2 Only a few of the differences are statistically 
significant; and, again, it is difficult to identify a clear relation between a country’s 
characteristics (financial or legal system, level of development etc.) and the relative 
performance (risk and return) of corporate groups. Nevertheless, both Table I and 
Table II suggest that, under some circumstances, certain business groups can be very 
successful.   
                                                            
2 The coefficients are country-specific effects of affiliation with a business group, drawn from a linear 
regression with controls for industry, time and other effects. See Khanna and Rivkin (2001) for further 
details. This is shown for illustration only; Khanna and Palepu (2000) propose a more elaborate non-
linear specification to gauge the impact of group affiliation in India on profitability.  
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  In addition to risk and return characteristics of business groups, it would have 
been interesting to observe structural differences among groups around the world. 
How many of them are vertically-controlled pyramids? The prevalence of pyramidal 
structures in groups around the world is important for the discussion of tunneling and 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Section III.2), yet we do not really know what 
fraction of all groups is organized in this fashion. Khanna and Thomas (2004) suggest 
that in Chile pyramids are not a major group characteristic, whereas in Korea this 
structure is apparently much more important (e.g. Chang, 2003a). Beyond 
organizational structure, how does the extent of diversification or vertical integration 
vary in business groups across countries? How extensive is family control and how 
common is group involvement in financial services? Even though answers to some of 
these questions are crucial for understanding the economic roles of business groups, 
we are not aware of any established conventional wisdom on these issues. Table III 
displays partial data on the extent of group diversification, vertical integration and 
involvement in financial services in ten of the twelve countries described in the 
previous tables.
3 There seem to be considerable differences in these characteristics 
across countries, and yet the relation between these attributes of business groups and 
geographic origins, institutions, or group performance is not straightforward.
4  
    Overall, the diversity of business groups around the world suggests that 
generalizations about their main economic roles, performance and impact are going to 
                                                            
3 Group diversification is measured by the number of 2-digit industries in which the group operates. 
Vertical integration is measured as follows: Group firms are classified into two-digit ISIC industries, 
and for each pair of firms (x, y) we observe the fraction of inputs from x’s industry to y’s and vice 
versa. We then record the higher value for each pair and average over all pairs in the group to obtain 
the group’s vertical integration index. Involvement in financial services is measured as the fraction of 
all group assets in group financial firms; See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for further details on these 
measures. 
4 The differences observed in Table III are reflected also in country-specific studies of business groups. 
For example, Lee and Woo (2002) compare the structure of the nascent Chinese groups with that of 
their more established Korean counterparts and find that group size and diversification is much more 
limited in China (see also Keister, 2004). 
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be hard to make. Nevertheless, the existing literature on business groups has focused 
on several features of groups and their relation to economic outcome. We now turn to 
a discussion of the existing literature in more detail.  
 
III. Dominant Research Perspectives on Business Groups  
In this section we analyze the literature on business groups as diversified 
structures, as equity pyramids, as rent-seeking mechanisms, and as instruments of 
market power. Existing scholarship has tended to oscillate between the view of groups 
as social-welfare reducing, and the interpretation of the group phenomenon as a 
potentially welfare enhancing response to imperfect markets (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000a and 2000b).  
 
III.1 Groups, Diversification and Performance  
Prevailing managerial theories advocate the importance of corporate focus - 
companies should specialize in their competitive advantage – and warn of the 
disadvantages of unrelated diversification (see surveys by Montgomery, 1994; Martin 
and Sayrak, 2003). This “conventional wisdom” is not based on unambiguous 
theoretical predictions. Theoretically, corporate diversification could be beneficial to 
shareholders if a firm has some resources that can be profitably deployed outside the 
industry in which it operates, such as entrepreneurial skills, technology etc. There are 
also theoretical foundations for the view that diversification can be harmful if it is 
driven by managerial objectives such as “empire building” or risk aversion, or if it 
leads to agency problems among division managers (e.g. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Thus, the common view that diversification 
“destroys shareholder value” is not based on an unambiguous theoretical prediction; 
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rather, it is based on empirical regularities observed primarily in the US. Modern 
evidence suggests that for US corporations, diversification is typically “bad,” that is, 
associated with a loss of firm value – a phenomenon called the “diversification 
discount.” In many studies, this discount is interpreted as evidence of a causal link, 
whereby corporate diversification, especially into unrelated industries, is the reason 
for the destruction of shareholder wealth, possibly serving the interests of risk-averse 
managers and perhaps also creditors.
5 Although several recent studies have cast some 
doubt on the causal interpretation of the diversification discount,
6 corporate focus is 
still viewed as a desirable corporate strategy, far more so than less-focused 
alternatives.  
The ubiquity of diversified (and often fairly successful) business groups in 
many countries outside the US is therefore in sharp contrast with the prevailing 
conventional wisdom. Leaving aside (for now) the question why the typical 
institutional mechanism for diversification is conglomerates in the US and business 
groups in emerging markets, is corporate focus not a good strategy outside the 
developed US economy? Or are business groups in developing countries inefficient, 
so that their dissolution might contribute to the economic development of the 
countries in which they operate?  
The discussion of business groups as diversified entities is closely related to 
studies of the costs and benefits of diversified conglomerates and internal capital 
markets (ICM) in the US. A natural starting point in the application of the US-based 
literature on diversification to the context of business groups is to ask whether the 
empirical association of diversification with lower shareholder value also exists in 
                                                            
5 For example, Amihud and Lev (1981), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), 
Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrel (1995).  
6 The arguments focus on the endogeneity of the decision to diversify and on measurement problems 
(both of performance and of diversification). See, for example, Campa and Kedia (2002), Chevalier 
(2004), and Whited (2001). 
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less-developed economies. The general answer to this question seems to be that the 
diversification discount tends to be lower in environments where markets, including, 
but not limited to, financial markets, are less developed. In some cases, diversified 
entities are even traded at a premium rather than a discount. Following the literature 
on the US which often relies on stock market data to measure the value of 
diversification, Fauver et al. (2003) find that the diversification discount is a feature of 
high income countries, with developed (financial) markets and institutions. By 
contrast, in low-income countries, there is no market discount - and sometimes there 
is even a premium - for corporate diversification. Qualitatively similar results are 
reported by Claessens et al. (2003a), who use both stock market and accounting 
variables to measure the value of diversification. They find a diversification premium 
in the relatively poor countries in East Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, or Thailand), 
and a diversification discount in the richer countries in the region (e.g. Hong Kong or 
Taiwan). Both Fauver et al. (2003) and Claessens et al. (2003a) refer to multi-segment 
firms, not specifically to corporate groups, but there is some indication that these 
findings might apply to groups as well. In this context, the excess value of groups and 
its relation to market development is often measured before and after significant 
market supporting reforms: for example, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) document the 
declining (stock market and accounting profitability-based) group premium over a 
decade associated with economic reform in Chile. Lee, Peng, and Lee (2001) observe 
that the companies affiliated with the Korean business groups, the chaebol, used to be 
traded at a premium until the early 1990’s – but the premium turned into a discount 
starting around 1994.
7 Ferris et al. (2003) also find that chaebol-affiliated firms 
                                                            
7 Jung, Kim, and Kim (2005) use a different methodology for calculating the premium/discount of 
Korean group-affiliated firms. They argue that chaebol firms traded at a premium in the period 1998-
2001, a period not covered by Lee, Peng, and Lee (2001). One possible explanation is restructuring and 
improved corporate governance in Korean groups after the East Asian crisis. Another possibility raised 
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currently trade at a discount, and suggest that this may be due to low profits, over-
investment or inefficient cross-subsidization within the groups (see more discussion in 
the next sub-section).  
These observations raise several conceptual and measurement issues. First, 
even under the assumption that a causal interpretation can be assigned to this 
correlation, the particular reasons why diversification is good or bad in certain 
countries or institutional environments cannot be inferred. Second, studies that rely 
primarily on stock market data do not seriously address the selection issue associated 
with the decision to list some group companies but not others. The direction of the 
bias this induces in estimates of the diversification discount (or premium) is unclear 
and might be country-specific. Third, diversification at the level of the individual line 
of business should be distinguished from diversification at the group level. In India of 
the 1980’s, for instance, many manufacturing companies invested in unrelated 
businesses as a way of sheltering income from an oppressive tax regime, with the 
result that a diversified group might have several different lines of business each with, 
say, a cement plant.
8  In contrast with these difficulties, it is important to note that 
because group firms are independent legal entities, data on “line of business” activity 
within business groups are potentially better than that obtained from within a 
conglomerate in the US (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a).    
  One clue for the identification of the reasons why diversification may be 
valuable in under-developed economies is found in historical observations on the US: 
the “diversification discount” appears to have been smaller in the US in earlier 
periods. De Long (1991), for example, argues that firms that were part of the J.P. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
by Jung et al. (2005) is that the source of the premium is access to internal capital markets by 
financially constrained group firms.   
8 This may be related to Lins and Servaes (2002) who find that, diversification is associated with a 
discount for firms affiliated with diversified groups in emerging markets when their groups are already 
diversified and there is little justification for diversification at the firm level. 
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Morgan group (had Morgan men on their boards) were traded at a premium in the 
early decades of the twentieth century (although causality is hard to infer from this). 
Moving to the 1960’s, Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) report that 
acquisitions of companies in industries unrelated to the bidder’s core industry were 
not penalized by US financial markets at that time. Furthermore, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) emphasize that the returns to bidders tended to be especially high when the 
acquired target firms were financially constrained. The interpretation of these findings 
is that raising capital internally might have been more efficient than communicating 
with any external potential providers of capital. 
But are internal capital markets the raison d’être of diversified business groups 
in under-developed countries? And if so, are information problems really the crucial 
factor? In order to provide preliminary answers to these questions, we now turn to 
attempts to gauge the sources of value generated by affiliation with a corporate group 
more directly. Although these studies deal with diversified groups, some of the 
arguments are not directly linked to diversification per se. Studies in this category 
typically use accounting data on profitability, investment, or growth rates, thus 
circumventing the unavailability of reliable stock market data in many emerging 
markets.  
 
Diversification and Performance: Group-affiliated vs. Unaffiliated Firms 
Studies using accounting measures to gauge the relative performance of 
group-affiliated firms date back to Caves and Uekusa’s (1976) study of industrial 
organization and business groups in Japan. Outside Japan, one of the earliest studies 
of this type is Chang and Choi (1988), who find that firms affiliated with a diversified 
group in Korea were more profitable at the time. They attribute the advantage of 
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group firms to organizational form – diversified groups are somewhat like a multi-
divisional firm, they argue, and their relative efficiency stems from effective 
management and lower transaction costs. This study could not, of course, distinguish 
between this reason and other possible explanations that made the biggest and most 
diversified Korean groups relatively profitable in the 1980’s, such as monopoly 
power, preferential treatment by the government, internal training of labor and more. 
In contrast with Chang and Choi’s (1988) earlier study, a variety of more recent 
studies on the Korean chaebol report relatively poor performance of group-affiliated 
companies in the 1990’s. This may reflect real changes in the economic environment: 
the Korean economy became more mature and liberalized in the 1990’s, reducing the 
advantage of business groups in accessing capital or foreign currency, somewhat in 
line with the view that the diversified group structure becomes less valuable as 
markets develop. But there are other possible reasons for the decline in performance 
of group-affiliated firms. Korea faced a severe crisis in 1997-1998, for which some 
observers blamed business groups. In the aftermath of the crisis, the government’s 
approach toward the big business groups underwent deep changes (see Section III.3), 
which may have also affected the ability of group-affiliated firms to generate profits. 
Finally, the fact that the founding generation of owners-managers had to turn over the 
keys to the second generation, typically within the family, may have had adverse 
effects as well (see Section IV.2). It is very difficult to disentangle the impact of these 
different forces; the focus on one economic force or another in the existing literature 
seems to be somewhat arbitrary. Thus, among the studies documenting the poor 
performance of members of Korea’s business groups in the 1990’s, Campbell and 
Keys (2003) report lower profits (but higher sales growth) for group-affiliated firms, 
and relate this finding to inadequate corporate governance: executive turnover, they 
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argue, is not closely related to performance. Shin and Park (2003) claim that, despite 
limited growth opportunities, group-affiliated Korean firms tend to over-invest 
(relative to the profit maximizing level). Similar arguments on over-investment, 
typically financed by (often state-subsidized) debt, are made by Lee and Lee (2002) 
and by Choi and Cowing (1999). Other studies such as Lee, Ryu and Yoon (2000) 
attribute the poor performance of chaebol firms to low productive efficiency, 
presumably also due to over-expansion. The empirical analysis employed in some of 
these studies is not always of the highest standard; nevertheless, it is probably safe to 
conclude that, at least in Korea, the advantage that diversified groups may have 
enjoyed in the past was eroded during the 1990’s, although the reasons (both for the 
past advantage and for its dissipation) are still far from clear.
9  
Moving from Korea to India, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find that the relation 
between diversification and profitability among Indian business groups is non-linear; 
beyond a certain level diversification is associated with higher profits. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000b) report that, in Chile too high levels of group diversification are 
associated with better performance. Their interpretation of this finding is that, groups 
in emerging markets make up for missing institutions. These need not necessarily be 
under-developed financial markets; imperfections in labor markets, limited 
enforcement of contracts, inadequate rule of law and other institutional deficiencies 
may give rise to business groups that generate these public goods for the benefit of 
group members. In line with this argument, Hyundai, for example, established a 
training center for technical personnel to be used by the entire group, as well as an 
applied research institute (see also Khanna and Palepu, 1997 on the Tata group in 
                                                            
9 In addition to the factors listed here, “sentiment” might have also played a role to the extent that 
group performance is driven by (domestic and foreign) investor preferences. Descriptions of Korean 
groups reflect also “sentiment” among researchers, especially the changed view of Korea following the 
financial crisis of 1997 from being a “tiger” where everything is done right, to an economy plagued 
with corporate governance problems and inefficient allocation of capital by the large corporate groups. 
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India, and Chang, 2003a, on human resource management in other Korean groups). In 
some sense, the view that groups make up for under-developed institutions is a 
generalized formulation of the transaction cost argument advanced initially by Leff 
(1976, 1978) and Strachan (1976). Nevertheless, the exact mechanism that relates 
group diversification and economic performance (in different environments) is not 
tested directly in any of these studies.  
Somewhat indirectly related to the studies discussed in this section are several 
studies that estimate investment-cash flow sensitivities for group and non-group firms, 
in the spirit of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1991). Shin and Stulz (1998) find that within US conglomerates, 
individual lines of business are not very sensitive to their own cash flows when 
making investment decisions; they are, however, sensitive to the cash flows of the rest 
of the conglomerate, suggesting the existence of an internal capital market which 
transfers resources across firms. Shin and Park (1999) apply this methodology to 
Korean business groups, and Perotti and Gelfer (2003) to Russian financial-industrial 
groups (FIG’s).
10 Both studies report findings that are in line with Shin and Stulz 
(1998). Shin and Park (1999) argue that internal capital markets within the Korean 
chaebol are inefficient (supporting too much investment by group firms with weak 
investment opportunities) whereas Perotti and Gelfer (2003) do not take a stand on the 
efficiency of such transfers in Russia. Although these studies do not deal with 
diversification per se or with performance-related outcomes, the notion of internal 
capital markets is closely related to the notion of diversification.     
  In sum, the studies discussed so far suffer from two major drawbacks. First, to 
the extent that differences in performance between group-members and other firms 
                                                            
10 See also Lensink et al. (2003) and van der Molen (2005) on investment-cash flow sensitivities in 
Indian groups. 
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are documented, it is not straightforward to relate such differences to particular group 
attributes. This problem is especially acute because certain group characteristics tend 
to coincide nearly perfectly. For example, in many emerging markets, large 
diversified groups enjoy close ties with their governments. To the extent that their 
performance is superior, is it due to the advantages of diversification or due to 
preferential government treatment? If diversified groups perform well, is it due to 
internal capital markets or to internal labor markets? Similarly, poor performance of 
group firms is hard to attribute to a particular factor: large diversified groups are 
typically family-controlled. To the extent that their performance is relatively poor, is 
it due to ineffective management by insiders, or is it due to over-expansion and 
diversification into industries beyond the core capabilities of the group? Perhaps close 
ties with the government lead to deviation from profit maximization? As noted above, 
these complex issues become even more difficult to address because of severe data 
limitations on groups and their activities. For example, information on unlisted 
member firms and their performance is almost never available to researchers. This 
appears to be especially important in Southeast Asia, where most of the assets owned 
by groups are typically not publicly traded. In other words, there is a selection 
problem regarding which group firms are listed, a feature which is likely to affect at 
least some empirical results.
11
  Another deficiency of the existing literature on performance and 
diversification is the exogeneity assumption that is made throughout in relation to 
comparisons between group-affiliated and other firms. Although the treatment of 
group affiliation as a historically determined, exogenous firm characteristic is 
sometimes reasonable, to the extent that certain (observable or other) firm attributes 
                                                            
11 We are aware of no systematic attempts to analyze the decision which firms to list out of all group 
firms. In India, it is common to think that the best group firms are listed, whereas some would argue 
that the opposite is true in Hong Kong.   
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affect the probability of group affiliation, this assumption may not be warranted.
12 We 
return to this issue in Section VII. 
Several studies have attempted to circumvent some of the conceptual and data-
related difficulties discussed above. Khanna and Palepu (1999a), for example, use 
survey data to in order to try and identify sources of benefits from group affiliation. 
Their analysis is based on intra-group confidential information, thus overcoming some 
of the data limitations common in the literature. Surprisingly, they find that in both 
Chile and India group activity (which is not restricted to capital markets, see below) 
increased during periods that follow extensive liberalization and pro-market reforms, 
and in a way which apparently enhanced profitability. Intra-group survey evidence 
described in this study suggests that this was more likely to be due to group 
advantages in product and labor markets than due to within-group internal capital 
markets. In this context, it is interesting to note that, even though some early studies 
(e.g. Leff, 1976 and 1978) emphasized the role of business groups in the context of 
imperfections in labor (rather than capital) markets, the literature on these issues is 
virtually non-existent, mostly because capital market data are easier to find. New 
evidence on these issues could be extremely helpful. 
 Fisman and Khanna (2004), attempt to identify benefits from affiliation with a 
diversified group by examining location decisions of group firms in India. They find 
that group-affiliated firms are more likely to locate in poor, under-developed parts of 
India than unaffiliated firms and state-owned firms, and interpret this as evidence that 
groups may provide certain infrastructural benefits to their affiliates, which are 
                                                            
12 Another econometric weakness in much of this literature is that group-affiliation is typically 
measured in a dichotomous way, without allowing for varying degrees of tightness of control, both 
across groups and across firms within the same group. The measured impact of group affiliation is thus 
an average across firms and groups. Claessens at al. (2004) is somewhat unusual in this respect – they 
attempt to measure the differential impact of group affiliation on group firms with different 
characteristics (e.g. age and growth opportunities).  
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especially valuable in severely under-developed regions. Other interpretations - for 
example, that groups tend to locate in the most corrupt states - might also be possible. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) use a different approach, and provide a series of 
statistical tests designed to investigate the explanatory power of one specific reason 
for performance differences between group firms and unaffiliated companies in a 
cross-section of countries: mutual insurance or risk sharing among group members 
around the world. The statistical tests reported in Khanna and Yafeh (2005) suggest 
that risk sharing is a characteristic of business groups only in a small number of 
emerging markets, most notably Korea, and to a lesser extent Thailand and Taiwan. 
They do not find a clear relation between the extent of group diversification and the 
prevalence of within-group risk sharing, and neither do they find any evidence that 
risk sharing is more common where external financial markets are under-developed. 
This study casts doubt on the importance of internal capital markets within diversified 
business groups as a source of group value, at least with respect to the provision of 
insurance in environments where the availability of state-contingent claims is very 
limited. Some of the tests in this study are designed so as to circumvent the concern 
about the endogeneity of group affiliation; the results, however, are not materially 
affected.
13  
  There are several other studies emphasizing a particular facet of diversified 
groups, without necessarily ruling out other aspects of group affiliation, or claiming 
that the facets studied are of particular importance. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), 
who study the Japanese keiretsu groups, and Guillen (2002), who studies entry of 
group-affiliated Korean firms into China, try to identify a link between group 
                                                            
13 A recent working paper by Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2005) tests a related hypothesis – that Indian 
groups provide assistance to member firms in financial distress. They find empirical evidence 
supporting this conjecture. See also Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2004) which is discussed in the next 
section. In passing, note that if groups were really a mechanism of mutual insurance, it would be 
natural to expect them to consist of mostly small firms, in contrast with the figures in Table I. 
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membership and patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI), finding limited evidence 
for the existence of such a channel. Even if affiliation with a diversified group has an 
effect on the activities of its members in foreign countries, it is probably not the raison 
d’être of business groups. Other recent papers (e.g. Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004; 
Mahmood and Rufin, 2004) focus on the relationship between group affiliation in 
Taiwan and innovation (with patenting as the patenting); the findings are mixed and, 
again, this is unlikely to constitute a primary explanation for group structure and 
performance (see also Montalvo and Yafeh, 1994, for an early study of this issue 
using Japanese data).  
In sum, the literature on business groups, diversification and performance 
discussed in this section is far from conclusive, and leaves many unanswered 
questions on the motives for group diversification and its consequences. 
Diversification may be a means to achieve superior performance as some of the 
studies reviewed here suggest, or it may be more closely related to other features of 
business groups discussed below, such as conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders or the genealogical evolution of the controlling family. In addition, 
diversification of business groups may not be a means to achieve any economic goal, 
but rather the outcome of other activities such as rent-seeking ties with the authorities 
or market power. Furthermore, it is quite likely that diversified groups combine more 
than one of the effects discussed in this section, making clear-cut identification of one 
primary reason for diversification difficult. In addition, both the motives for 
diversification and the resulting outcomes (the performance of diversified groups and 
their welfare implications) are likely to vary across different institutional and 
economic environments.  
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One possible solution to these issues may be found in the judicious selection 
of countries where particular reasons are likely to feature more prominently than 
others: for example, diversification in relatively uncorrupt Chile is unlikely to be 
merely the outcome of rent seeking, whereas another mix of reasons may better 
account for the diversification and performance of business groups in Suharto’s 
Indonesia.  
Another related possibility is to try and disentangle various reasons for the 
existence of groups by looking at changes in their activities and scope in response to 
shocks (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). For example, a rent-seeking business group 
may vanish in response to a shock to its rent-seeking opportunities, whereas a group 
whose primary function is to make up for under-developed financial markets would 
not. Accordingly, Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) regard periods of profitable 
expansion by groups in India and Chile in the face of adverse regulatory changes as 
evidence that these groups are not purely a mechanism for rent-seeking.  
 Yet another possibility is to exploit key events involving particular groups – 
for example, controlling-family transitions, socially or politically motivated 
dismantling or amalgamation of groups, etc. The literature has barely explored such 
alternative analytical approaches.    
Despite the ambiguity of the results in this section, our impression is that there 
is some tentative evidence suggesting that, at least under some circumstances, groups 
can make up for under-developed institutions, thereby reducing transaction costs. 
Although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from this, one possible implication 
might be that the profit maximizing level of diversification (and perhaps also the level 
of diversification which maximizes social welfare) may be higher for companies (or 
groups) operating in emerging markets than it is in for American firms. It is not clear, 
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however, why the business group form (rather than a fully-owned conglomerate, for 
instance) is the most popular way to attain this level of diversification in many less 
developed economies. The answer may be related to conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders (which are discussed in the next section), to inheritance and 
family considerations (which are discussed in Section IV.2), or to legal considerations 




III.2. Groups, Pyramids and Tunneling 
The second most popular view of business groups is as equity pyramids. In 
these structures there is typically a large divergence between the controlling 
shareholder’s “control rights” (which are often very high) and “cash flow rights” 
which are typically much smaller. This, together with the inadequacy of some of the 
regulatory institutions in many emerging markets, generates an environment in which 
“tunneling” (the expropriation of minority shareholders) can become a common 
feature of the economy. A large literature focusing on investor protection has 
attempted to model and measure the extent of tunneling within business groups, which 
are viewed in this context as “parasites,” expropriating small unprotected 
shareholders. The discussion of business groups in this context is therefore closely 
linked to discussion of property rights and rule of law.
15
                                                            
14 See, for example, Blumberg (1989), Antunes (1994) and Dine (2000) for discussions of corporate 
law and the liability of related but legally independent firms in several developed economies. Nicodano 
(2003) argues that limited liability considerations are actually the primary reason for the existence of 
business groups, an organizational form which she regards as superior to conglomerates: unlike 
conglomerates, groups are not legally obliged to bail out ailing units (group firms) and, because group 
firms are legally separate, there is always an option to liquidate some of them. 
15 In line with recent trends in the literature, we focus in this section on conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders only, and ignore the classic agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers as well “entrenchment” issues which are discussed in Morck et al. (2004). 
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Before discussing this literature, it is important to note that the premise that 
groups and vertically-controlled equity pyramids are equivalent is suspect. As noted 
in Section II, it is not at all clear what fraction of all groups is organized as pyramids 
and more empirical evidence on this issue may be helpful. Even when pyramidal 
structures do exist, it is not always clear that all members of a single pyramid are part 
of what the market considers a group: in the case of Chile, for example, there is no 
clear mapping between pyramids and groups. In addition, stock price co-movement 
among group firms cannot be explained well by equity pyramids, but rather by other, 
broader, definitions of groups (Khanna and Thomas, 2004). Despite these caveats, the 
rest of this section will use the working assumption that a sufficient number of 
business groups are pyramidal in structure (or that other group features, such as 
horizontal cross shareholding, facilitate tunneling), and that a discussion of potential 
conflicts between control shareholders and other investors is therefore warranted.   
 The starting point of this literature is Berle and Means’ (1932) concern about 
pyramids in the United States. More recently, La Porta et al. (1999) find that widely-
held firms are rare outside the US and the UK. By contrast, concentrated family 
ownership, often exercised through pyramids and other mechanisms that enable 
control in excess of cash flow rights are quite common around the world. Therefore, 
outside the US, conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders are likely to 
be more common than conflicts between dispersed owners and independent 
management. This view is supported by Barca and Becht’s (2001) description of 
ownership and control of European firms (see also Faccio and Lang, 2002), and by the 
evidence in Claesens et al. (2000 and 2002) on the ownership and control of Asian 
firms. In view of this, Morck et al. (2004) regard family-controlled pyramidal 
business groups in countries where minority shareholders are not well protected as 
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environments where expropriation of small shareholders by controlling wealthy 
families is likely to take place, a phenomenon which may adversely affect the ability 
of firms to raise external finance.    
  The evidence on the prevalence and severity of this phenomenon, however, is 
less than clear-cut. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2000) describe 
several cases of tunneling in Europe, including some involving intra-business group 
transactions. More systematic evidence on tunneling within business groups is 
provided by Bertrand et al. (2002) who study Indian groups, and find that firms 
located lower within pyramidal groups are less sensitive to industry-specific shocks to 
their profitability than are firms located in upper levels. They interpret this result as 
evidence that positive shocks to firms in lower levels of the pyramid are siphoned off 
to firms in upper levels of the group pyramid, an activity that serves the interests of 
controlling shareholders, but not of minority shareholders holding equity of the 
tunneled firm only. While this interpretation is plausible for positive shocks, it is less 
self-evident why tunneling would make these group firms less sensitive to negative 
shocks as well. 
Joh (2003) suggests the existence of tunneling within Korean groups. She 
finds low profits in group-affiliated companies where there is substantial divergence 
between the cash flow and control rights of the controlling family. Claessens et al. 
(2002), in a paper that does not specifically address business groups, report for a 
sample of Asian companies that firm value tends to increase with the cash flow rights 
of owners, but value falls when there is divergence between cash flow and control 
rights. Presumably, this happens in many Asian countries in the context of business 
groups. Lins (2003) reports that insider-controlled firms in emerging markets are 
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often parts of pyramids within which profits fall with the divergence of cash flow and 
control rights. 
Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) use another approach to identify tunneling and 
examine acquisitions of often ailing companies by other group firms within the 
Korean chaebol groups. They find that within-group takeovers rarely raise the value 
of the bidder, but do raise the value of other group members. They also provide some 
examples (from the LG group, for instance) showing how such takeovers benefited 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.
16 Very closely 
related methodologically is a study by Baek, Kang, and Lee (2005) whose focus is on 
private securities offerings within Korean groups, rather than takeovers. They find 
that some of these securities are offered to other group members at prices that are very 
far off from their true values, and document negative stock price responses to such 
deals. Despite the tunneling interpretation favored in these studies, some intra-group 
takeovers and securities placements may also constitute efficient mutual insurance or 
risk sharing, as Khanna and Yafeh (2005) document for Korea.
17  
  Other evidence on tunneling include Morck and Nakamura (2005), who 
suggest that the growth patterns of some of the Japanese prewar zaibatsu reflected, 
among other things, the importance attributed to private benefits of control by some 
large shareholders. The importance of this consideration relative to other factors, is 
however, open to some debate. Friedman et al. (2003) show theoretically that 
tunneling-related considerations may, under certain circumstances, account for the 
well documented phenomenon that many groups are highly leveraged. Nevertheless, 
                                                            
16 By contrast, Buysschaert et al. (2004) document a positive price response to within-group equity 
sales in a small sample of pyramidal Belgian groups, a result which is not consistent with the tunneling 
hypothesis of Bae et al. (2002). 
17 Within-group risk sharing is supported also by Bae, Cheon and Kang (2004). They find that earnings 
announcements of group firms affect the stock prices of other group firms (in the same direction), a 
result which is consistent with risk sharing, or with what they call “propping” of weak group firms. On 
earnings announcements within Korean groups and their possible relation to tunneling see also Kim 
and Yi (2005).   
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the relation between tunneling and group debt is far from straightforward and other 
considerations (e.g. related to family structure and control) are also likely to affect the 
debt ratios of corporate groups.  
There are other studies which are indirectly related to the tunneling 
phenomenon, though not directly to business groups. For example, Nenova (2003) 
and Dyck and Zingales (2004) document high control premia in countries where 
minority shareholder protection is poor and capital markets are under-developed. The 
relation between control premia, minority shareholder rights and business groups, 
however, appears to be rather complex. Korea, for example, is found to have a high 
control premium in both studies, yet in certain other countries where business groups 
are dominant (e.g. Indonesia) control premia are low. Furthermore, in some European 
countries (e.g. Austria or the Czech Republic) the value of controlling blocks is much 
higher than in the chaebol-dominated Korean economy. Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman (2000) suggest that tunneling is common in countries where investor 
protection is low, and that it is especially severe in crisis periods. Countries that were 
hit hardest by the Asian financial crisis are, according to this view, countries 
associated with poor corporate governance and pervasive tunneling – for example, 
Korea or Indonesia, where corporate groups are especially powerful.
18     
   Overall, it is easy to get the impression from the literature that the problem of 
tunneling in general, and within business groups in particular, is both common and 
severe. We are not sure. Groups are not always pyramids, nor are all pyramids groups. 
Furthermore, even where groups are pyramidal in structure, reputation and other 
safeguards might preclude minority shareholder exploitation. Holmen and Hogfeld 
(2005), for example, dispute the equation of pyramids and tunneling in present-day 
                                                            
18 In line with this view, Mitton (2002) finds that insider-controlled, diversified firms fared worse than 
other companies during the Asian financial crisis. Lemmon and Lins (2003) report qualitatively similar 
findings for firms with extreme divergence between cash flow and control rights. 
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Sweden, where there is adequate investor protection. Historically, tunneling did not 
seem to be a major concern for British investors in the early twentieth century, who 
were eager to invest money in multinational trading groups with pyramidal 
characteristics; affiliation with pyramidal, family controlled, British merchant houses 
was apparently viewed as a stamp of certification, rather than a reason for fear of 
expropriation (Jones, 2000, Chapter 6; see also Section V).
19 A modern analogy might 
be Jardine Matheson’s significant investment in the mid 1990’s in Tata Industries, an 
Indian business group with outstanding reputation for quality and honesty. Tata had 
considerable discretion regarding the use of the invested money, which was designed 
to provide Jardines with exposure to the Indian economy (Khanna, Palepu, and Wu, 
1995). 
In addition to the tendency to equate groups with pyramids and to associate 
pyramids with tunneling, much of the literature pays only little scant attention to the 
participation constraints of investors in these pyramidal schemes.
20 Why, on a routine 
basis, do investors continue to invest in situations where their investment is likely to 
be abused? It is, perhaps, possible to argue that naïve investors in emerging markets 
invest in business groups prone to tunneling because of inexperience or inadequate 
human capital; we find this implausible. Another possibility is that the feasible 
alternatives available to investors are extremely limited, although this claim probably 
did not apply historically to British investors in pyramidal merchant houses. An 
explanation that we find more plausible is that group reputation is sufficient to 
account for investor interest. One example of this could be that group reputation for 
risk sharing (or the “propping” of poorly performing companies) reduces the default 
risk of group-affiliated companies, a feature which investors may find attractive even 
                                                            
19 It is interesting to note that these pyramidal business groups did not operate within the UK, only 
overseas. This may support the view that business groups make up for under-developed institutions.  
20 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) is a notable exception. 
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if they know that they are exposed to a certain risk of expropriation by controlling 
shareholders (although as noted above, Khanna and Yafeh, 2005, cast some doubt on 
the prevalence of within-group insurance around the world). Faccio et al. (2001) 
suggest that some groups, especially in Europe, pay higher dividends and thus 
compensate investors for the risk of expropriation. Finally, a “fair” amount of 
tunneling is likely to be reflected in equity prices (Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung, 
2000). One anecdote in support of this is the alleged discount on the shares of 
Samsung Electronics in comparison with Nokia. To the extent that this is the case, and 
if business groups are indeed more prone to tunnel than other firms, one would expect 
a negative impact of business groups on the development of financial markets. This, 
together with other considerations (e.g. entrenchment, see Morck et al., 2004) are 
discussed in Section V, where we examine the dynamic impact of groups on their 
environment. It is important to note here, however, that if tunneling is primarily a 
transfer from small to large shareholders, it need not always reduce social welfare. If 
the transfer is fully transparent, the assumption that it is welfare-detracting is even 
more suspect.
21  
Another unorthodox possible explanation for the willingness of small 
investors to buy shares of certain pyramidal business groups is that the extent of 
tunneling is over-emphasized in the recent academic literature in economics and 
finance, perhaps because of the greater media coverage of scandals, relative to the 
more humdrum business of generating healthy but pedestrian returns. Stated 
differently, at least some part of the alleged tunneling may in fact represent returns to 
some core asset, with the investing public’s participation constraints being satisfied, in 
                                                            
21 A fascinating recent study by Cheung et al. (2004) finds evidence of tunneling in Hong Kong, which 
is often manifest in “connected transactions” between related parties. This study reaches the surprising 
conclusion that tunneling is not anticipated and reflected in equity prices, and that investors are 
“surprised” when a connected transaction takes places. In passing, note that Cheung et al. (2004) do not 
find that tunneling is particularly common in pyramidal groups.   
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an environment with scarce investment opportunities. This asset could be both a 
socially productive one, such as some core entrepreneurial ability, or a socially 
detrimental lobbying capability (e.g. Faccio, 2004). At present, the literature provides 
very few answers to these questions. 
 
III.3. Groups and Politics: The Complex Relations between Groups and Governments 
Business groups have enjoyed close ties to their governments in many 
countries, and it is therefore not surprising that the political economy literature on 
groups has often viewed government-supported business groups as “parasites:” 
Influential papers such as Bhagwati (1982) or Krueger (1974), while not directly 
studying groups, have been used in support of arguments on rent-seeking through the 
power exercised by incumbent businesses, typically family-based business groups. 
Indeed, the interaction between groups and the state has received much attention over 
the past few decades. In this section we review the political economy literature on 
business groups and argue that, while there is ample evidence for rent seeking by 
some groups in some environments, the conventional wisdom on these issues is one-
sided and the relationships between groups and the state are far more complex.  
There is no doubt that in many countries the very appearance of the business 
group phenomenon was strongly influenced by government policies: The Japanese 
prewar zaibatsu groups emerged as a result of a government privatization program in 
the early 1880’s, and expanded and diversified their activities in response to 
government contracts awarded under preferential terms. The close ties between the 
zaibatsu and the Japanese government are described by many scholars - a classic 
reference is Hadley (1970). The Korean business groups, the chaebol, enjoyed close 
ties to the government of General Park; the Korean government controlled the 
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allocation of credit and foreign currency, and the chaebol enjoyed preferential access 
to these and other resources (e.g. Clifford, 1994; Kim, 1997, Chang, 2003a). The 
privatization policies of Prime Minister Mahathir’s government in Malaysia enriched 
certain ethnic Malay-owned business groups dramatically (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
Keister (1998 and 2004) describes how the government actively encouraged the 
formation of business groups in China and protected them from foreign competition. 
In Israel family-owned groups emerged as an outcome of certain government 
economic policies (Maman, 2002), and the rise of the “oligarchs” in Russia is yet 
another interesting recent example of the emergence of groups under the auspices of 
the government (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). Table IV (which is discussed in more 
detail below), presents a comparative perspective on the origins of business groups 
around the world; government support seems to be an important factor in the 
formation of business groups in many environments, although even within countries 
where groups generally enjoyed government support (see Panel B on prewar Japan 
and Panel C on Korea), some groups emerged with little or no government favors (e.g. 
Samsung). 
Moving from the formation of groups to their close relations with governments 
more generally, Fisman (2001) provides convincing econometric estimates of the 
value of political connections enjoyed by business groups in Indonesia during the 
Suharto regime (see also Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2004). Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) evaluate political connections in Malaysia, although they do not emphasize 
business groups. In India, some business groups were able to receive favorable 
treatment from the “License Raj” in certain periods (Khanna and Palepu, 2005). There 
is also some anecdotal evidence on groups exercising their political influence to resist 
(positive) institutional changes: for example, in recent years, the Federation of Korean 
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Industries, where groups are dominant, attempted to use its influence to oppose 
certain reforms in corporate governance legislation (Chang, 2003a). The Bombay 
Club (of Indian industrialists) is another example of group attempts to lobby for 
restricted entry of multinationals (Tripathi, 2004).  There are yet more extreme 
examples of symbiosis between business groups and the government: each of the two 
major Japanese zaibatsu, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, virtually controlled one of the major 
parties in the Japanese parliament in the 1910’s. More recently, some owners of 
Korean chaebol seemed to entertain political aspirations (e.g. Chairman Chung of 
Hyundai ran for president in 1993), a Turkish business group has launched a political 
party, allegedly so that their representation in government can confer political 
immunity on them (Mango, 2005), and business groups centered on political parties 
can be found in Malaysia (e.g. the Malay political party UMNO, or the Chinese 
political party MCA; see Gomez and Jomo, 1999 and some discussion in 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1995).    
But governments and business groups do not always operate symbiotically. 
First, there are a number of historical examples when governments harmed, rather 
than assisted, business groups. This has happened both in times of wrenching societal 
transformation - e.g. when the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949 - and in 
an ongoing sense when groups struggled in the face of an inimical state - e.g. India’s 
socialist government in the few decades following Indian independence; indeed 
Khanna and Palepu (2005) point out that the turnover in leading Indian groups across 
the past 60 years is far too high to be consistent with entrenchment and close group-
government ties.
22 In Pinochet’s Chile, after the fall of Allende’s Socialist government 
                                                            
22 For one to nonetheless subscribe to a pure entrenchment and collusion (between groups and 
government) story in this context, one would have to attribute this turnover to systematic incompetence 
on the part of the groups.  
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in 1973, pro-free-market and anti-ownership concentration policies were adopted. 
These were sometimes closer to anti- than to pro-business group policies. In the US, 
Morck (2004) and Morck and Yeung (2004) describe how President Roosevelt took 
policy measures against business groups (see Table IV for other examples). In other 
cases, the relationship between governments and business groups changed over time, 
as groups became stronger and more independent. This seems to have been the case in 
Japan in the 1930’s (Franks, Mayer and Miyajima, in progress) and in Korea starting 
in the 1980’s (Amsden, 1989; Clifford, 1994; Kim, 1997; Chang, 2003a; Lee, Lee, 
and Lee, 2000). In fact, in post-1997 Korea the government has actively tried to 
weaken the chaebol with limited success (Khanna and Palepu, 1999b) although 
Borensztein and Lee (2002) provide evidence that group firms lost their preferential 
access to capital following the crisis. 
The literature’s general bias to assuming that governments operate in tandem 
with business groups is thus flawed. Beyond this, the prevailing assumption that 
government support of groups is socially harmful should be examined more closely. 
Despite the negative implications of government favors of the type described above, 
business groups may have helped governments orchestrate a “big push” in several 
sectors simultaneously (arguably in prewar Japan, see for example Ohkawa and 
Rosovsky, 1973). In other cases, governmental favoritism towards business groups 
controlled by an ethnic minority may have helped preserve social equilibrium, as in 
Malaysia. The assumption that governmental support of Malay business groups is 
socially costly is based on an analysis of costs and benefits of group affiliation at a 
point in (contemporary) time. But there are no attempts of which we are aware to 
analytically evaluate the societal costs and benefits of Prime Minister Mahathir’s New 
Economic Policy’s forced transfer of assets (from economically dominant Chinese to 
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numerically dominant, and poorer, Malays) over three decades that created business 
groups around favored Malay entrepreneurs. The transfer surely was costly to the 
Chinese, but arguably beneficial at least to some Malays, and should be benchmarked 
against a counterfactual of an increasingly intransigent social fabric in the tense 
situation following the 1969 race riots.
23 Such government-directed transfers are 
currently being attempted in South Africa, under the label of Black Economic 
Empowerment, with groups forming around emergent successful black entrepreneurs 
in the post-Apartheid regime – again, the overall economic value of such a policy is 
not easy to gauge.
24  
Finally social welfare might be enhanced by group-government liaisons if, for 
instance, the relation between groups and governments has to do with tax collection 
and fiscal policy. Do governments favor groups because it is easy to collect taxes 
from them? If so, this would be reminiscent of medieval monarchs who partitioned 
their territories into fiefdoms controlled by quasi-independent lords who could rule 
them as they saw fit as long as they paid their taxes to the government. This issue has 
rarely been addressed in the literature: Morikawa (1992) notes that taxes collected 
from the Japanese zaibatsu during World War II were substantial. By contrast, Morck 
(2004) describes how the US tax authorities felt that collecting taxes from business 
groups was especially difficult because of tunneling, and so supported (perhaps even 
initiated) President Roosevelt’s attack on business groups. Gramlich et al. (2004) 
argue that members of Japanese corporate groups shift income between themselves in 
order to lower their tax liability. Chang (2003) suggests that Korean groups shift 
                                                            
23 An analysis taking into account all these factors would, of course, be complex. It would have to 
account for Chinese capital flight, as well as, for example, for the endogenous setting up of a Southeast 
Asian empire by Robert Kuok, originally a Malaysian Chinese; see Commonwealth of Australia 
(1995). 
24 The relevant legislation is the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Bill, No. 53 of 2003. See 
also Cargill (2000).  
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funds so as to reduce their tax liability. Clearly, more systematic evidence on this 
issue from various countries would be of interest. 
Analytically, it might not always be sensible to study just the interaction 
between the private sector and the government, without considering additional 
constituencies. For example, Musacchio (2004) argues that the rise of business groups 
(and concentrated ownership) in Brazil coincided with the rising power of organized 
labor, with the government playing only a background role. Huang (2004) discusses 
the general suppression of the indigenous private sector in China. This analysis, along 
with Keister’s (2004) study of the forced formation of business groups in China, 
suggest that the government favors business groups formed by the state, but 
discriminates against business groups formed by private entities, a stance which may 
emanate from a general suspicion of the Communist Party of the indigenous private 
sector . 
In some countries, the government might itself be in transition, and the study 
of the formation and evolution of business groups and their relations to the 
government might be informed by knowledge of the flux in the latter itself. In 
Czechoslovakia, for example, newly formed groups reflected new networks of 
companies, as power shifted from the Communist government to the regime that 
replaced it (McDermott, 2002, summarized in Table IV; see also Stark, 1996, on post-
Communist corporate networks in Hungary). Somewhat related is a historical 
anecdote from early twentieth century British India, when the Birla group supported 
and financed indigenous Indian businesses and entrepreneurs as an alternative to the 
British-dominated business scene, hardly an act reflecting close government-business 
ties (Piramal, 1998; Tripathi, 2004).  
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Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, political economy 
explanations for the formation and effectiveness of groups, beyond the traditional 
focus on government favors, should receive more attention than they have so far. 
Second, it might be more fruitful to view the relations between groups and the state as 
the equilibrium outcome of a game, in the spirit of work by Aoki (2001) and Greif 
(2005). These games are typically complex, and their application to a particular 
context is not always straightforward. Nevertheless, conceptually, the result of such a 
government-business group game might well be rent seeking and cohabitation, but it 
might also be an uneasy coexistence, quite distinct from the outcome of groups 
currying favor with the state.
25  
 
III.4 Groups, Industrial Organization and Monopoly Power 
There are good theoretical reasons to suspect that business groups may wield 
considerable market power. They may, under some circumstances, drive their rivals 
out of markets, or prevent entry, due to their “deep pockets,” “first mover advantage,” 
and ties to the government. “Multi-market contact” (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) 
between diversified business groups competing with each other repeatedly in many 
sectors may facilitate collusion. These theoretical conjectures echo earlier concerns 
about the social costs associated with restricted competition due to business groups - 
indeed, the view that business groups harm competition dates back to the Great 
Depression in the US. Morck (2004) argues that President Roosevelt sought to 
dissolve America’s groups (by taxing inter-corporate dividends) partly on these 
grounds. One of the primary objectives of the postwar American occupation reforms 
in Japan was the dissolution of the prewar zaibatsu, which was driven by strong views 
                                                            
25 As an example, it would interesting to model the relation between ties with the government and the 
business group structure, in contrast with politically connected firms that operate only in one industry 
and are not connected to other group firms.   
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on their anti-competitive effects and the resulting social tension that may have 
contributed to the rise of militarism in Japan (Hadley, 1970; Yafeh, 1995).  
Strangely enough, despite its intuitive appeal, the literature on the industrial 
organization effects of business groups has not developed much. The theoretical 
relation between group affiliation and entry deterrence is explored formally in an 
interesting recent study by Cestone and Fumagalli (2005); they show that internal 
capital markets are not always advantageous to group affiliated firms when they try to 
deter entry; under certain conditions they may actually be “softer” than stand-alone 
firms.
26 Also related to the theoretical industrial organization literature is Feenstra et 
al.’s (2003) model of the relation between business group structure, monopoly power 
and patterns of competition in international markets. There seems to be scope for 
many more theoretical analyses of groups and industrial organization.  
Modern empirical evidence on the (plausible) hypothesis that business groups 
restrict competition is surprisingly scarce. Encoua and Jacquemin (1982) investigate 
French industrial groups and find little evidence of their having any market power 
(although the econometric techniques used in empirical industrial organization have 
evolved significantly since then). Instead, they favor a Chandlerian view of business 
groups as an efficient form of a multi-divisional firm. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) 
argue that Japan’s bank-centered groups compete aggressively against each other 
rather than collude. There are occasionally (unsubstantiated?) claims on intense 
rivalry between the Korean chaebol (even if true, this need not preclude anti-
competitive deterrence of entry by non-group firms), or about collusion among ethnic 
Chinese business groups in East Asia (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995). Overall, it 
is surprising that no attempts have been made to use modern NEIO (New Empirical 
                                                            
26 See also Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2004) who discuss related issues in the context of 
conglomerates with internal capital markets. 
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Industrial Organization) techniques to assess the market power of business groups 
around the world, and this may be a promising line for future research. Our view on 
this issue is that, just like other potential effects of groups on economic activity, the 
context (or the economic environment) must matter for the impact of groups on 
competition and market structure. Market power is more plausible in South Korea or 
in South Africa, where four or five leading groups account for the vast majority of 
market capitalization, than in India or Brazil, where the top groups account for less 
than 10 percent. But as of now, this is merely a conjecture.  
 
III.5 Groups as Networks: Insights from the Related Sociology Literature  
The vast literature in economic sociology views business groups as networks 
and often relates their prevalence to notions of “trust.” This concept is somewhat 
related to economic arguments regarding the less than perfect rule of law in many 
emerging markets as reflected both in the description of groups as a possible 
substitute for missing institutions of contract enforcement and in the literature on 
tunneling discussed above. Sociologists often emphasize that kinship and other social 
ties, for example, facilitate economic transactions. But the sociological literature goes 
beyond that, and regards some network structures as serving primarily social and 
cultural purposes, rather than seeking to achieve economic objectives. This approach 
shifts the focus from group diversification or pyramidal structure to other forms and 
functions that groups may take.  
Granovetter (2005) is an excellent survey of the literature on business groups 
in economic sociology. His starting point is that the mixed evidence on the 
performance of group members (discussed in Section II) suggests that considerations 
other than economic efficiency may be at play. This is reinforced, he argues, by the 
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enormous variation in the structure of business groups around the world, which is 
likely to reflect societal, cultural, institutional and other norms going beyond standard 
economics. Factors ranging from corporate law (in the US) and state leadership (in 
Korea), to inheritance customs (e.g. primogeniture or other), kinship structure, 
national ideology and even pride, may all play a role in shaping corporate groups in 
different environments. Cultural edicts on how economic exchange should be 
arranged, rather than a rational response to missing markets or economic institutions, 
may account for differences in the structure of groups between, for example, Korea 
and Taiwan (Hamilton and Feenstra, 1997; Hamilton, 1997). Indeed, according to 
Hamilton (1997), Taiwanese groups and supplier relations should be understood as 
culture-specific networks of relatives and friends (guanxi in Chinese).   
Another theme emphasized in this school of thought is the multi-dimensional 
(social and economic) ties that connect group members: equity and debt relations are 
just one mechanism of holding the group together, and in some cases this may not 
even be the most important one. Thus, Khanna and Rivkin’s (2000) econometric 
analysis of Chilean business groups questions the equation of business groups with 
equity-linked organizations, and Siegel (2004) points to the importance of regional 
and school ties relative to equity and debt in Korea. Somewhat related is the issue of 
group identity, which is sometimes linked to ethnic and social background (e.g. in 
India or in Malaysia). In this respect, some of the economic sociology literature views 
groups as a vehicle to achieve goals related to this sense of identity or to social status, 
rather than as a means to maximize profits or diversify investments (Granovetter, 
2005). 
One implication of this literature is that it is not surprising that groups tend to 
persist, even when the economic considerations no longer justify it (see Section VII). 
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Another is that treating business groups as networks might lead to a variety of 
potentially useful and virtually unexplored analogies between business groups and 
other network-based institutions. These could range from networks of shipyard 
workers and their families in Glasgow (Ingram and Lifschitz, 2003), to the networks 
of Chinese business in Asia (Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), the Chinese 
Diaspora more generally (Pan, 1999), and even some of the commercial networks of 
medieval Europe.   
 
IV. Novel Approaches to the Analysis of Business Groups 
IV.I Groups as a Nexus of Unfamiliar Contracts 
Many of the common perspectives of business groups can be considered 
within an umbrella view of groups as a nexus of contracts (using the terminology of 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, conglomerates represent a form of non-
market-based contracting among business units, pyramidal equity structures are built 
around chains of equity contracts, and it is also possible to view groups as symptoms 
of familial contracts (see below). Our objective in this section is to introduce 
contracting views of business groups that may be potentially helpful in understanding 
this institution, but that researchers have left relatively unexamined. Another, implicit, 
objective of this section, is to portray several under-explored dimensions of business 
groups in emerging markets; these may shed some light on the question why, unlike 
conglomerates, this diversified organizational form is so common outside the US.   
One unexplored view of business groups would focus on within-group debt 
contracts in order to draw parallels between groups in emerging markets and LBO 
organizations in the US.
27 Baker and Montgomery, for example, in an unpublished 
                                                            
27 We thank Krishna Palepu for suggesting this analogy. 
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manuscript from 1994, compare (American) conglomerates and LBO organizations. 
Business groups appear to share contractual features both with conglomerates and 
LBO organizations: as in LBO’s, each business group affiliate is organized as a 
separate legal entity, with its own fiduciary responsibilities, its own board, and its 
own disclosure regime. Just like LBO associations that finance individual purchases 
with heavy leverage, business groups often launch new ventures with financial 
support from financial intermediaries. In India, for example, a typical new venture of 
the past few decades was launched with very little equity capital from the 
entrepreneur (just as in an LBO) and a lot of (equity and) debt from domestic 
institutional investors. There is also extensive evidence that the Korean chaebol were 
extremely heavily leveraged (Clifford, 1994; Chang, 2003a), a feature that made them 
especially vulnerable during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. (As we show in the next 
sub-section, one reason for the high leverage ratios of business groups may be the 
desire to maintain family control, which could be at risk if external equity is used 
above a certain level).  
But the parallel between business groups in emerging markets and American 
LBO organizations should not be taken too far. Debt from Indian institutional 
investors or from government-controlled financial institutions in Korea would hardly 
have the disciplining character of debt from American capital markets in the heyday 
of LBO’s. Another striking difference is that LBO organizations in the US were 
forced to liquidate their investments within a defined time period. This led to an 
independent measure of the value of each business (in order to sell it), and to a 
powerful incentive structure, quite different from that prevailing in the case of a 
business group in an emerging market.  
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Another nexus of contracts-type perspective through which groups can be 
viewed is related to the process of entrepreneurship. New ventures initiated by 
business groups rely not just on capital infusion from the group, but often also on the 
group brand name and implicitly on its reputation, providing a guarantee that is scarce 
in emerging markets. There is also an internal (within-group) market for talent. In the 
absence of such mechanisms for internal growth, and given the lack of well 
functioning markets for risk capital, these ventures would simply not exist. In this 
sense business groups are perhaps closer to private equity firms than to 
conglomerates. Jones (2000) makes this point in relation to British trading houses in 
the early twentieth century: one the primary functions of these early groups (which, 
like many venture capital funds today, were often organized as partnerships) was 
“identifying opportunities and placing potential British investors in touch with them” 
(pp. 50-51). It may be possible to argue that in India today Tata Industries comes 
close to this view of a business group as a quasi-venture capitalist, albeit with longer 
investment horizons than typical American private equity funds (Khanna and Palepu, 
2005). Another Indian group, Birla, helped found and finance new firms, which were 
later spun-off, using the entrepreneurial talent of its employees.  The process of 
“spawning” new companies by established firms or business groups may potentially 
be important in emerging markets where it is probably difficult to start de novo.
28 
Nevertheless, the business group-VC analogy has not been systematically explored. 
Finally, there is a natural, yet virtually unexplored, analogy between business 
groups and multinational firms. In a sense, a multinational company is a cross-border 
contract between headquarters and local subsidiaries. (Usually, in modern parlance, 
the contract is an intra-firm one, but occasionally the headquarters might contract with 
                                                            
28 See Gompers et al. (2005) for a discussion of entrepreneurial spawning in the US. 
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local entrepreneur to form a joint venture). There are plausible analogies between 
internalizing cross-border transactions because of cross-border market imperfections 
(e.g. Caves, 1996, and more recently, Foley, 2002), and internalizing within-country 
transactions because of local market imperfections. There may also be some 
similarities between within-group transfers (risk sharing or tunneling) and transfer 
pricing within multinational firms. More generally, the relative economic importance 
of geographic diversification, export orientation, and industrial diversification is 
virtually unexplored. Jones’ (2000) study of historical British trading houses is a good 
starting point because, in contrast with most modern groups, these were global 
enterprises (see also Jones and Wale, 1998). This characteristic of historical groups 
may become more important in the future as groups in developing countries (Korea 




IV.II Groups as Familial Constructs   
Although conceptually family ties can be viewed as another type of contract, 
this evolving literature raises enough interesting issues to warrant a separate sub-
section. As noted before, some of the literature on groups within sociology regards 
business groups as a family organization, whose objective is tied to the social milieu 
(Orrù  et al., 1997). Diversification, for example, may be interpreted as a way to 
manage family assets   –   firms are merely asset holders for lineage interests (Hamilton, 
1997), although it is not clear from these studies why family assets cannot be divided 
into independent companies without the group structure. In contrast with the literature 
in sociology, the economic and financial literature on family firms is in its infancy, 
                                                            
29 See also Fauver et al. (2004) for an investigation of the possible analogy between the discount at 
which diversified firms are traded, and the valuation of multinational firms.  
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and mostly recent. Nevertheless, it contains several interesting implications for the 
analysis of business groups. Conversely, the study of business groups in emerging 
markets as family-controlled entities, can inform the literature on family firms in 
developed economies.   
Entry points into this literature are Morck et al. (2000) and Morck et al. 
(2004), who emphasize a correlation between the dominance of a few families and 
slow economic growth. The causal link between family ownership and poor 
performance is, however, controversial and seems to depend critically on ownership, 
management (internal or external) and succession issues that seem extremely relevant 
to the analysis of business groups. Chronologically the earliest in the micro-economic 
literature we discuss in this section is Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) who measure 
stock market responses to management succession in Canadian family firms. They 
find that a negative stock price response to the appointment of family members as 
managers, which is mostly due to their relative young age and inexperience (see also 
Perez-Gonzalez, 2001). Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show that a surprisingly high 
fraction of the S&P 500 firms in the US are family controlled (although their 
definition of family firms is controversial), and that these firms perform relatively 
well, especially when a family member serves as CEO. Amit and Villalonga (2004) 
qualify these findings and suggest that family firms add value only when the founder 
serves as CEO or as chairman with a hired CEO. They also measure the relative 
agency costs of conflicts between ownership and management and between 
controlling family shareholders and minority outsiders, finding that the latter conflict 
is not as severe as the former in founder-CEO firms. In a related paper, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003b) do not find evidence of high diversification and of minority shareholder 
expropriation in family-controlled American firms. Anderson et al. (2003) show that 
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family firms can raise debt finance relatively cheaply, because of a congruence of 
interests between equity and debt holders – owners of family firms are relatively risk 
averse because of considerations related to succession or to their limited 
diversification. The latest in the rapidly growing empirical literature on family firms is 
Bennedsen et al. (2005), who use an unusual data set from Denmark to examine the 
determinants of family succession and its influence on firm performance. Moving 
from empirics to theory, some of these issues are modeled in Burkart, Panuzi, and 
Shleifer (2003) and in a number of other recent studies.
30 This entire literature 
discusses family firms, not business groups directly, and these results may or may not 
be applicable to different social and economic environments. Nevertheless, the issues 
raised, such as succession, differences between founder-controlled firms and 
successor-controlled ones, the importance of family control vs. family management, 
the tendency to use debt finance and the link between all these and performance seem 
highly relevant for the analysis of business groups. 
A recent working paper by Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantarak and Schoar 
(2004) is the first to examine these issues systematically in the context of Thai 
business groups dominated by Chinese families. Using elaborate data on 70 groups, 
they show that the group structure is related to family history and evolution, for 
example, to the number of male sons of the founder or to the number of brothers he 
had. Bertrand et al. (2004) also attempt to relate diversification and growth to family 
considerations, and to link group performance to intra-family feuds.
31 The relation 
between family considerations and business group structure is apparently not specific 
to Thailand: Piramal (1998, p. 337), for example, provides anecdotes describing how 
                                                            
30 See, for example, Bhattacharya and Ravikumar (2001), Caselli and Gennaioli (2002). 
31 See also Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) for information on families and business groups in 
Thailand. 
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inter-generational considerations influence the structure of business groups in India.
32 
There is also anecdotal evidence of the importance of family considerations, such as 
succession issues, to the conduct and performance of the Korean chaebol (see 
Amsden, 1989, for an early discussion of this point, and Kim, 1997).
33  
As noted in previous sections, there is a tendency of many groups to use debt 
rather than equity finance. This feature may be related to family ownership, reflecting 
a desire not to dilute control (Chang, 2003a, discusses this in the context of the 
Korean chaebol). It is not clear, however, if this tendency is more pronounced in 
family-controlled groups than in stand alone family firms.
34
We find the family-firms line of research highly promising, although future 
applications of this approach to business groups are not straightforward. First, while 
all of the studies discussed in this section focus on the link between families and firm 
performance, performance might also affect the stability of the familial contract and 
thereby the structure of families. Bertrand et al. (2004) make the first step in 
addressing this issue when they treat the number of male off-springs as an endogenous 
outcome. Second, in many cultures, it is not at all clear that “what one sees is what 
one gets” with regard to the family assets. In other words, the best assets of the family 
might not be the publicly listed parts (Bertrand et al., 2004, and Khanna and Palepu, 
                                                            
32 The decision of Williamson Magor Group to acquire Union Carbide India in 1994 was apparently 
prompted by the Khaitan family’s worry about its offspring’s habits. “Worried that their son … was 
spending too much time in their stable of three hundred horses, Shanti (Khaitan) persuaded her husband 
to make an offer …. Deepak (Khatian) needed to settle down, and she was convinced that a big 
company like Union Carbide would be just the right ticket.” Similarly, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a cotton 
textile magnate, made four large investments the period 1929-1935, of which three were designed to 
sustain his nephews’ careers, and the fourth was to avoid disgracing the family name by bailing out an 
errant family member. 
33 Keister (2004) also discusses family and business group structure in Korea and China; 
Commonwealth of Australia (1995) emphasizes family-related issues as determinants of group 
structure in Indonesia, and describes family ties and inheritance customs in ethnic Chinese business 
groups in several other East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (2000) discuss family firms as an 
important feature of Asian companies more generally, and Jones (2000) regards historical British 
trading houses as well-functioning family-controlled groups.  
34 On various other aspects of debt finance in business groups, see Bianco and Nicodano (2002) or 
Manos et al. (2004).  
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1999a, attempt to address this issue). Furthermore, the equity contracts that are visible 
to the public observer and the social scientist might not be the most meaningful 
contracts in systems where relationship contracting predominates. Thus, future studies 
on business groups as family firms will face formidable data constraints. One way to 
progress might be to contrast business groups that are single-family controlled 
(presumably the vast majority) with those that are either not family controlled (e.g. 
business groups orchestrated by the government in China as described by Keister, 
2004, or some Chilean business groups described by Majluf et al. 1995), or are 
controlled by multiple families (e.g. LG in South Korea for at least part of its history, 
or some joint ventures between the Koc and Sabanci groups in Turkey). Finally, 
viewing the family as the unit of analysis, rather than the firm, might provide some 
insights. In a classic and related analysis of Chile in the 1960’s, Zeitlin and Ratcliff 
(1988) find little coincidence of land ownership and business control at the level of 
the individual, but a high degree of overlap at the family level.   
 
V. Historical and Dynamic Analyses of Business Groups 
Historical and dynamic (over a long period of time) perspectives of business 
groups can enrich our understanding of this institution in several ways. First, it would 
be interesting to compare the validity of cross-sectional explanations for the ubiquity 
and performance of business groups with time-series based perspectives (Jones and 
Khanna, 2005). For example, is the evolution of a particular group or of groups in a 
given country, consistent with one of the explanations proposed by the modern 
literature? Do groups evolve in a fashion that is consistent with missing institutions, 
risk sharing, tunneling, use of a scarce resource, etc.? Unfortunately, most of the long-
term views of business groups, often in the business history tradition, are not written 
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with clear hypotheses and tests in mind. For example, the Japanese prewar zaibatsu 
come to mind as an obvious example for an opportunity to carry out a long-run study 
of business groups, because of the wealth of information about their activities and 
development, providing over five decades of data. Morikawa (1992) is the most 
detailed English-language study of these groups with a plethora of information on 
their origins, evolving relations with the government, growth and diversification 
patterns, controlling families, human resource management, and more. Although he 
tends to interpret the zaibatsu growth and diversification history in a Chandlerian 
tradition of efficient management and use of internal resources, the evidence is not set 
up in a way that enables testing competing hypotheses about the reasons for the 
existence and growth of these groups. Several recent attempts have been made to 
overcome the a-theoretical nature of much of the business history literature: As noted 
above, Morck and Nakamura (2005), for example, re-interpret much of the evolution 
of the zaibatsu as evidence of tunneling. Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (in progress) 
disagree and do not find much evidence of tunneling in the major zaibatsu groups; 
instead, they argue that small shareholders were happy to invest in their shares in the 
stock market dominated financial system of prewar Japan (see also Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2001). Moving beyond Japan, there are a number of historical studies of the 
Korean  chaebol, spanning a shorter time horizon than their Japanese equivalents; 
again, much of this literature is descriptive in nature. Chang (2003a), one of the most 
comprehensive historical studies of the Korean chaebol comes close to presenting 
explicit hypotheses about their growth and evolution: The Korean chaebol, he argues, 
much like the Japanese zaibatsu in the late nineteenth century, developed under the 
auspices of a development-oriented government, but gradually became independent 
and pursued a growth strategy that reflected their resources and competitive 
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advantages. Other examples of theory-driven historical studies are Maurer and 
Sharma’s (2001) study of the evolution of nineteenth century Mexican business 
groups (which, in their view, was a response to limited contract enforcement), Khanna 
and Palepu’s (2005) study of the evolution of business groups in India (which, they 
argue, fits the view of groups as a substitute for under-developed institutions; see also 
Jones, 2000 on historical British groups), and Aganin and Volpin’s (2005) study of 
the evolution of Italian groups (which focuses on investor protection and political 
issues).  
  Many more historical studies with explicit hypotheses in mind, especially 
with competing hypotheses whose testable implications can be contrasted in time-
series data, could be highly informative in order to shed further light on the evolution 
of groups, on path dependence (ways in which “history matters”), and on the raison 
d’être of group formation and development. 
A second important advantage of historical studies is that they can address 
questions that cannot be addressed in cross-sectional studies. One example can be the 
use of a time series-based perspective to draw evidence on what groups do in order to 
shape the environment in which they operate, rather than merely react to it (in ways 
that could be socially beneficial or in ways involving social costs). Historically, 
groups have often invested in market-supporting infrastructure and launched new 
industries (the Japanese zaibatsu are a good example). Kim (1997) argues that the 
Korean groups lobbied for liberalization in the 1980’s. By contrast, groups may resist 
certain political reforms, improvements in minority shareholder protection or antitrust 
legislation (this seems to be the case in Korea in recent years). Entrenchment (Morck 
et al., 2004), or extensive tunneling could impede the development of financial 
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markets. We are not aware of any systematic historical studies which are motivated by 
this perspective.  
Another important question that can hardly be addressed in cross-sectional 
studies is the question of the origin of groups, a subject on which there is virtually no 
systematic comparative work. Table IV presents a preliminary overview on this 
question drawn from country-specific and group-specific historical studies: the 
general importance of group-government ties comes across very strongly in the table, 
although there are certainly some important exceptions (e.g. Taiwan among the 
countries in Panel A; Samsung among the groups described in Panel C). Transfer of 
colonial assets, family considerations, and some ethnic-related issues also appear in 
several countries. Despite some repeated patterns, there is quite a bit of variance in the 
origins of different groups even in similar institutional environments – the origins of 
eight prewar Japanese zaibatsu and five Korean chaebol, described in Panels B and C 
of Table IV, suggest a variety of backgrounds and origins for groups that are usually 
regarded as similar. The table does not answer the question why business groups 
evolved in these countries rather than diversified conglomerates or other structures.   
To a certain degree, history can also illuminate the issue of longevity of 
business groups (e.g. Yafeh, 1995, on the zaibatsu dissolution in Japan) – at present it 
is unclear whether groups tend to survive for longer periods than stand alone firms 
and whether or not they ever dissolve voluntarily; we return to this issue in the 
concluding section. 
  Finally, the application of games describing institutions in the spirit of Aoki 
(2001) and Greif (2005) is often difficult without a time dimension which facilitates 
the incorporation of features such as reputation, changing attitudes and more. This is 
yet another reason to investigate business groups from a historical perspective. 
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Before proceeding to the discussion of the literature on Japan’s corporate 
groups (in the next section) and to our preferred agenda for future research (in the 
concluding section), it may be useful to pause and summarize the trends in the 
existing literature on business groups discussed in this survey by focusing on articles 
dealing with groups in one country, Korea. Table V summarizes many of the English 
language journal articles on the Korean chaebol: the literature exhibits a pronounced 
shift in recent years from a positive (or at least mixed) view of groups as diversified 
entities to a clear impression that groups are undesirable. Table V also illustrates some 
strong trends in the economics-finance profession, as reflected in the recent focus on 
tunneling and conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Features of 
corporate groups which were praised in some of the early studies when Korea was 
doing well (e.g. centralized control) have been reinterpreted more recently as potential 
weaknesses, which are detrimental to small shareholders.
35 Finally, Table V exhibits 
many of the methodological shortcomings discussed in this survey, in particular the 
tendency to focus on listed or quasi-listed (audited) firms (because of data 
constraints), the limited use of information on group structure and on familial and 
other possible intra-group contracts, and the absence of a dynamic perspective. 
Extending the literature to remedy these shortcomings is promising.   
 
 
                                                            
35 There is an interesting analogy between the literature on corporate groups in Korea and the literature 
on the Japanese financial system. When Japan was considered a “miracle,” the small number of 
bankruptcies in that country (due to close ties between banks and their clients) was interpreted as 
evidence of the efficiency of the Japanese financial system, where unnecessary bankruptcies are 
avoided (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990). Later, the same statistical correlations were 
reinterpreted as evidence of inefficiency, where banks artificially keep alive virtually bankrupt 
“zombies” (Peek and Rosengren, 2003). 
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VI. Is the Literature on Japan’s Corporate Groups Relevant for Understanding 
Groups in Emerging Markets?  
A discussion of business groups in emerging markets cannot be complete 
without some reference to the theories and evidence on the Japanese keiretsu, and 
their precursors, the zaibatsu – the subject of a large body of research spanning nearly 
three decades. The popularity of Japan as a testing ground for theory and evidence on 
business groups stems partly from data availability and partly from the desire of 
scholars to decipher the secret the “Japanese miracle.”  
Much of the vast literature on Japan’s corporate groups (surveyed in Yafeh, 
2003) has focused on “horizontal” or bank-centered groups. An important feature of 
these studies is the emphasis on bank-firm relationships within Japanese groups 
(“main bank” ties), as opposed to the anonymous relations in Anglo-Saxon stock 
market-based financial systems (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; see a survey of the 
literature in Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001), which have implications for capital allocation 
decisions, corporate governance or assistance to member firms in financial distress.  
The institutional underpinnings and economic environment in postwar Japan 
are different enough from those of contemporary emerging markets that we advocate 
caution in generalizing results and conclusions from the Japan-keiretsu literature.   
Financial institutions within Japanese corporate groups, the focus of this literature, are 
often non-existent in other countries, and few of them wield as much power as the 
major Japanese city banks did in much of the postwar period. In addition, present-day 
Japanese bank-centered groups have no controlling families and no organized 
mechanism of joint decision making – characteristics that feature prominently in 
many less developed economic environments. For example, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) 
examine whether the conventional wisdom on Japanese group members as low 
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profitability and low risk firms with mutual risk sharing arrangements applies to a 
sample of emerging markets. As noted in Section III, they find that, as far as risk and 
return profiles are concerned, the behavior of groups in most emerging markets, with 
the notable exception of Korea, is often very different from the behavior of Japanese 
group members. 
A second type of group in Japan is the so-called vertical group, or 
manufacturer-centered group organized around a large manufacturer and its suppliers, 
within a given industry (e.g. the Toyota group). The efficiency of these groups has 
been studied extensively (see a brief discussion and references in Yafeh, 2003): the 
main thrust of the argument is that such groups combine insurance and incentives in a 
way that is designed to reduce hold-up problems through long-term relations without 
full vertical integration which suppresses market incentives. To some degree, this 
literature may be of relevance to the study of groups elsewhere to the extent that they 
involve significant within-group trade and vertical integration (e.g. see Chang, 2003a, 
on vertical integration in Korean groups). On the other hand, the “Toyota system” is 
unique in many ways (within Japan too) and it is not clear that the manufacturer-
supplier (vertical keiretsu) relationship is the most crucial element in it.     
Perhaps the most promising comparison between Japan and present-day 
emerging markets can be done using historical data on the prewar Japanese zaibatsu 
which operated in an institutional environment which is much closer to the one 
present in many developing countries. In contrast with the literature on corporate 
groups in postwar Japan, studies of the prewar zaibatsu using the modern tools of 
economics and finance are surprisingly scarce, and many more insights can 
potentially be drawn from systematic comparisons of the evolution and performance 
of the Japanese zaibatsu between the 1870’s and World War II and business groups in 
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other countries (a comparison with the Korean chaebol is the most immediate 
example that comes to mind because of their structural similarities to the zaibatsu of 
the past – indeed, the words zaibatsu and chaebol are different ways to pronounce the 
same combination of Chinese characters). 
 
VII. An Agenda for Future Research 
The concluding paragraphs of many of the preceding sections contained some 
ideas for immediate extensions of existing studies using different approaches, 
techniques and data. The purpose of this final section is to outline more general 
directions for future research, in view of what we believe we know, and what we 
would like to know, about business groups in emerging markets. Taking a broader 
(and longer) perspective on the literature, our impression is that there is yet no verdict 
on the economic roles played by business groups around the world (“the jury is still 
out”). The evidence on the roles played by business groups is mixed, involving some 
benefits and some costs. There is no general answer to the question whether business 
groups are “paragons” or “parasites,” partly because of the vast differences across 
countries and groups, and partly also because groups are likely to have multiple 
effects, some of which are desirable, others less so.  
Moving to general methodological observations, much of the literature is 
subject to doubts about extent to which comparisons between groups and non-groups 
are valid. First, the formation of business groups remains unexplained in much of the 
literature. No study to date has managed to portray empirically the endogenous 
formation of business groups (by using compelling instrumental variables or some 
other method). The theoretical work on this issue is also in its infancy. Second, 
selection effects may also hide important information – it is difficult to compare 
  53    
groups and non-groups since they might be suited to activities in different kinds of 
industries. And finally, the literature is unclear regarding the appropriate 
counterfactual: against what benchmark should groups be evaluated? The ideal is a 
well functioning market economy, but in reality the world consists of distant second-
bests. These observations dictate our preferred future research agenda. 
 
How are Groups Formed?
Theory and evidence on the endogenous formation and dynamic evolution of 
corporate groups are largely missing, and more evidence on these issues could shed 
light on the reasons for group existence and development. On the theory side, there 
are only a handful of relevant models – Kali (1999) studies the endogenous formation 
of business networks in response to limited contract enforcement by the legal system; 
he has also modeled imperfect information in capital markets as another possible 
motive (Ghatak and Kali, 2001; Kali, 2003). Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) propose 
a theory to explain the formation of pyramidal groups – here again the focus is on 
financial market imperfections and on the ability to use the internal funds of the entire 
group. This theory departs from the conventional, albeit typically informal, view that 
pyramidal groups are formed to generate a wedge between control and cash flow 
rights – an approach that can perhaps explain to some extent the prevalence of 
business groups rather than conglomerates (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2000; Bianco et al., 
2001). A particularly intriguing theoretical direction (also related to under-developed 
financial markets) would relate the formation of groups with risk attitudes: are groups 
a mutual insurance arrangement that attracts risk averse, weak, economic agents? Kim 
(2004) offers a model along these lines; empirical evidence by Munshi and 
  54    
Rosenzweig (2004) on informal mutual insurance institutions in India, and by 
Abramitzky (2005) on the Israeli Kibbutz may offer some useful insights.   
Another, empirical rather than theoretical, direction for research on these 
subjects is historical – can the evolution and patterns of growth of business groups 
offer any insights on the original reasons for their formation? For example, the 
business groups in evidence in India today have vastly different types of origins. 
Some, like the Tata’s and Birla’s were created by indigenous entrepreneurs during the 
time of the British Empire. A second wave, like the Goenkas and the Khaitans, were 
the product of the post-independence (1947) transfer of assets from the British to 
Indians. A third set originated during India’s “License Raj” of the 1960’s and 1970’s.   
Existing empirical studies of these issues are often based on small data sets 
and employ empirical techniques that are not fully convincing. For example, Chung 
(2001 and 2004) examines the origins and evolution of groups in Taiwan, 
distinguishing between reasons related to market forces, culture, and societal 
institutions, but the relative empirical importance of these factors is hard to 
disentangle. Tsui-Auch (2005a) documents a tendency among ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Singapore to form diversified business organizations (in comparison 
with ethnic Indian entrepreneurs), and attributes this interesting observation to the 
cultural heterogeneity of the Chinese community. The empirical support for this 
claim, however, is suspect because of other systematic differences in the background 
of Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in Singapore. More sophisticated empirical 
analyses of the differential origins of business groups are likely to be valuable.  
Somewhat related conceptually is the idea to use within-country variation in 
the structure and development of business groups to draw some conclusions on the 
forces that lead to their formation. For example, it appears that the Chinese 
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government pursued liberalization primarily in regions where it was weak (the south), 
and not in the northeast (e.g. Beijing) where the Party had its pre-1949 stronghold. Is 
it the case that state-sponsored groups created by fiat are developing primarily in the 
northeast?
36 Variation in group presence across Indian provinces might shed light on 
the relation between the formation of business groups and issues related to ethnic 
identity and perhaps also “trust.” For example, is it possible to map the presence of 
certain ethnic groups in certain regions (e.g. Marwaris in Rajasthan and, by migration, 
in Bengal; Chettiars in the south) to the formation and development of groups along 
similar ethnic lines? This entire agenda is related also to recent attempts to identify 
factors affecting the variation in ownership structure of (Korean) group-affiliated 
firms – for example, the relation between firm characteristics or performance and the 
equity stakes of insiders or family members (see Chang, 2003b; Kim, Lim and Sung, 
2004; and Lim and Kim, 2005).  
 
The Longevity of Groups /Are Groups Ever Dissolved?  
In most countries, very long-lived groups can be found. In some cases, groups 
have survived over a long period, starting in an era when the country was poor, all the 
way to prosperity (e.g. Sweden). But there is no systematic evidence on the question 
whether or not the longevity of group affiliates exceeds that of otherwise comparable, 
unaffiliated firms. More generally, when looking around the world, one gets the 
impression that, if groups ever dissolve, this typically follows a dramatic change in 
government policy: President Roosevelt deliberately attempted to dismantle American 
big businesses during the Great Depression (Morck, 2004; Morck and Yeung, 2004), 
                                                            
36 Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2005) is the first attempt to exploit empirically the variation in the formation 
of pyramidal business groups in China, although not exactly along the dimensions we propose here. 
They relate the formation of state-controlled pyramids to provincial fiscal conditions, and the formation 
of privately owned pyramids to the depth of the founding entrepreneur’s pockets.  
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which may explain why he could muster the necessary political will. The American 
occupation authorities forcefully dissolved the Japanese zaibatsu after World War II 
(Yafeh, 1995). The Korean government attempted to curb the power of the major 
chaebol following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Khanna and Palepu, 
1999b; Chang, 2003a) with limited success - a recent collective volume (Chang, 
2005) suggests that the business group phenomenon in Korea and elsewhere in Asia 
did not disappear following the 1997 crisis, although some groups did collapse and 
others were forced to restructure.
37 Moving from East Asia to post-Apartheid South 
Africa, the dramatic change in the political scene has brought about the unbundling of 
some white-controlled groups (and the emergence of some new “Black-
Empowerment” groups and conglomerates).    
Can groups ever die peacefully? We are not sure. One of the few examples of 
such a process is provided by Jones (2000), who describes the demise (or re-focus) of 
British trading houses during recent decades in response to a changing environment 
(rise of diversified institutional investors in London, decolonization abroad, decline in 
trade in raw materials etc.). Morck et al. (2005) show that Canadian pyramids died 
peacefully in the mid twentieth century due to market crashes, inheritance taxes, and 
other factors, but new groups arose to replace them in the later decades of the century. 
There is also some recent evidence on the on-going, gradual decline of cross 
shareholding in Japanese corporate groups (Okabe, 2003; Yafeh, 2003; Miyajima and 
Fumiaki 2004). 
                                                            
37 Chung and Mahmood (2005) show that Taiwanese groups became more diversified both across 
industries and across countries following the crisis (a result reminiscent of Khanna and Palepu, 1999a); 
they also became more pyramidal in structure. Tsui-Auch (2005b) examines both government-owned 
and privately-owned groups controlled by ethnic Chinese in Singapore, finding certain gradual changes 
(increased focus) but much continuity. Gomez (2005) documents significant weakening of Malaysian 
groups with the demise of their patrons, Daim, Anwar, and eventually Prime Minister Mahathir. Polsiri 
and Wiwattanakantang (2005) describe the restructuring of Thai business groups and Hanani (2005) of 
Indonesian groups. None of these studies suggests that the dissolution of business groups in any of 
these countries is imminent.       
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We believe this line of research offers some very interesting questions. Can 
corporate structure in emerging markets self-evolve into a more focused structure as 
the country develops? What is the role of government in this process? Is it advisable, 
or even possible, for the state to forcibly dismantle groups, as has been attempted in 
Korea? Even if groups have run their course, is it clear that the desired policy is to try 
and dissolve them (Khanna and Palepu, 1999b)? Is a policy of benign neglect more 
feasible (as in India)? Or is it preferable to adopt a policy of supporting market-
institutions actively (as in Chile) that in turn may impose discipline on errant and 
wayward groups? Is it clear that when the social costs of corporate groups exceed 
their social benefits, private costs to group owners will also exceed private benefits? 
Can groups involving substantial inefficiencies persist for a long time? If so, is it 
because of a weak corporate control environment? Because of social reasons (e.g. 
families who diversify to accommodate disparate interests of next generation)? These 
are complex theoretical issues; at present, we are aware of only one study that tries to 
address them theoretically: Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005, discussed again in the 
next sub-section) argue that because of negative externalities (on the ability of non-
group firms to raise finance) business groups do not realize the full cost of their 
presence (and presumably will not dissolve on their own).  
 
What is the Appropriate “Counterfactual” to Corporate Groups?  
When evaluating the role of corporate groups and their impact on social 
welfare, we do not know what the appropriate counterfactual is – what would have the 
economy looked like without groups? This “fallacy of the idealized counterfactual” 
makes the evaluation of groups difficult: In the absence of groups, would there be 
other forms of networks? Would market-supporting institutions emerge 
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spontaneously? What can we learn from recent policy interventions (e.g. in Korea or 
China) about the right counterfactual? This agenda might involve substantial 
theoretical work, not only empirical evidence. Again, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005), 
who evaluate the welfare implications of business group as a function of measures of 
efficiency of external financial markets, is an interesting starting point.   
 
What Do We Know about Group Involvement in the Financial Sector?  
A different, interesting direction for future research could attempt to relate 
group involvement in banking, insurance and other aspects of the financial system to 
the costs and benefits of business groups. Some of the Japanese main bank literature 
(where the financial aspects of business group activities are emphasized) could be of 
help. Other studies, for example by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Zamarippa (2003) 
on the negative sides of “related lending” could also inspire more systematic work on 
these aspects.
38 In the early 1980’s, Chilean groups were implicated in a financial 
crisis and the associated failure of the first wave of privatization in that country, 
allegedly because of related lending. Beyond this, is there any indication that group 
involvement in financial markets is in any way related to the on-going debate on 
universal banking? Is there systematic evidence that group lobbying and involvement 
in finance hinder the development of financial markets? These issues are close in 
spirit to the recent political economy of finance literature, where investor protection 
and related financial system institutions are modeled as endogenous outcomes of 
political processes (e.g. Pagano and Volpin, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
 
 
                                                            
38 See also Chang (2003a), Chapter 5. 
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Groups and Macroeconomic Crises  
  Finally, it has recently become trendy to relate corporate groups, especially the 
poor corporate governance within them, to the financial crisis in East Asia (e.g. 
Corsetti et al., 1999; Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000; Mitton, 2002, Kim 
and Lee, 2003; Baek et al., 2004).
39 Somewhat related is the argument that crony 
capitalism enabled groups to borrow particularly easily, and moral hazard problems 
associated with this may have precipitated the crisis (Charumilind et al., 2002). The 
popular press, especially in Korea, echoes these concerns. But are countries whose 
economies are dominated by business groups more crisis prone than countries 
characterized by stand alone companies? Is it the case that if a few families control a 
large fraction of an economy through business groups, microeconomic governance or 
management difficulties may turn into macroeconomic problems? On theoretical 
grounds, this is uncertain – links between group firms may propagate adverse shocks, 
but mutual insurance within groups can sometimes dampen them (Khanna and Yafeh, 
2005). Empirically, the ubiquity of business groups may render such an exercise 
difficult, but this line of research has potentially important welfare and policy 
implications.   
 
To us, business groups remain a fascinating topic for research, with potential 
implications for a variety of important questions in economics and finance. Despite 
the growing academic interest in recent years, we believe that the scope for future 
research on this institution is very promising. 
 
                                                            
39 Claessens et al. (2003b) is also related: they argue that within-group internal capital markets do not 
function well in crisis period. 
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Table I: Group Affiliation around the World 
The table shows summary statistics on group risk and operating performance for 
twelve emerging markets as well as for prewar and postwar Japan. Firm numbers, as 
well as statistics on firm size (total assets) and median return on assets (ROA) are all 
based on the year for which we have maximal coverage for the country in question. In 
prewar Japan, group affiliation refers to affiliation in the largest three zaibatsu only. 
In postwar Japan, group members are defined as members of Presidents’ Clubs only. 
Significance levels for the comparisons of medians are based on Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests. Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below –100 percent are 
excluded from the analysis. * and ** denote a difference between group-affiliated and 
other firms that is significant at the 5 percent and 10 levels, respectively. See Khanna 
and Yafeh (2005) for data sources and for more information on the sample and 
















































Argentina 90-97  25  11  5.5  3.9  7.8**  3.7  4.9** 
Brazil 90-97  108  51  2.5  3.3  1.8**  4.1  5.1 
Chile  89-96  225  50 18.7 5.9 2.2* 4.4 4.1. 
India  90-97  5446  1821  4.4 11.7  9.6* 4.6 4.4* 
Indonesia  93-95  236  153  2.8 7.3 7.8 1.9  2.5* 
Israel  93-95  183  43 5.0  6.3 3.9* 2.1  2.6 
Korea  91-95  427  218  3.9 4.8 5.1 1.9  2.6* 
Mexico  88-97  55  19 2.3 8.2 6.1 3.1 2.6 
Philippines  92-97  148  37 3.4 7.3 4.0 2.5 2.9 
Taiwan  90-97  178  79 2.0 5.1 6.2 1.7  2.3** 
Thailand  92-97  415  258 2.3  2.9 4.4* 4.3  4.9** 




32-43  58  17 6.8 5.5 6.4 4.4 7.1 
Postwar 
Japan 
77-92  1002  94 8.5 3.4 3.6 2.2 2.3 
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Table II: Risk Sharing and Operating Profitability: Benchmark Specification 
Column 1 displays coefficients on a group-affiliation dummy in a regression where 
the dependent variable is the standard deviation of operating profitability and right-
hand-side variables include firm assets, industry dummies, average profitability 
(coefficients not shown), and the group dummy. All regressions in this column are 
weighted by the number of observations per-firm and include heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. To get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients, the 
mean standard deviation of operating profitability for each country appears in Column 
2. Firms with profit rates above 100 percent or below –100 percent are excluded from 
the analysis. Column 3 reproduces the regression coefficients on group affiliation, 
where the dependent variable is profitability (ROA), drawn from Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001), Table 3. * denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level, and ** 
denotes a coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent level. See Khanna and Yafeh 

























Argentina -8.3 5.3  -2.8* 
Brazil -1.7*  5.6  -0.1 
Chile  -1.0 6.4 -0.4 
India  +0.1* 6.1 +4.0* 
Indonesia -0.0 2.7  +2.2* 
Israel -0.3  3.7  +2.4 
Korea -0.6*  2.8  0.6 
Mexico  -0.9 3.4 -0.6 
Philippines  -0.8 4.5 -1.9 
Taiwan -0.7**  2.9  +1.9* 
Thailand -1.4*  6.1 1.1 
Turkey  -1.5 8.1 -2.5 
Prewar Japan  -3.8*  4.9  -5.9 
Postwar Japan, 
1977-1992 
-0.4*  2.5  See  text and 
Yafeh (2003) 
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Table III: Group Heterogeneity around the World 
Group diversification is measured as the number of 2-digit industries in which the 
group operates. Group vertical integration is the average input-output coefficient 
across all pairs of firms within the group (see footnote 3), and involvement in 
financial services is measured as the fraction of all group assets in group financial 
firms. See Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for data sources and for more information on the 












1.4 0.04  N/A 
Chile 
 
5.1 0.06  0.24 
India 
 
4.2 0.04  0.05 
Indonesia 
 
2.1 0.04  0.45 
Korea 
 
1.7 0.04  N/A 
Mexico 
 
2.7 0.02  0.05 
Philippines 
 
3.1 0.08  0.60 
Taiwan 
 
1.6 0.02  0.01 
Thailand 
 
3.5 0.04  0.35 
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Table IV: The Comparative Origins of Business Groups 
Panel A: Comparisons by Country 
 
  State-backing (general)  Privatization-related  Ethnic Policies and Family issues 
Brazil 
State protection (through tariffs and non-
tariff barriers and through targeting of 
priority sectors) benefited groups, as did 
extensive state financing. In the 1990’s 
protection decreased (although there is 
still some state backing in the form of 
technology and research grants and 
support). 
  Family ties have always been at the center 
of groups and groups today are still owned 
and sometimes run by the families that 





Government encouraged the formation 
of many business groups and protected 
them from foreign competition because 
they were regarded as essential for 
development. However, government 
sentiment waxed and waned depending 
on the fortune of business groups in 
neighboring countries, particularly 
South Korea. In addition, the People’s 
Liberation Army has historically been 
involved in several business ventures, 




Some groups benefited from the 
consolidation policies following the 
crises of 1970’s and 1980’s. 
Some groups benefited from 
privatization during the 
Pinochet regime. 
 
Costa Rica  A limited role of the state combined 
with a historically homogeneous 
distribution of land and coffee plants. 
However, government protection of 
some sectors (e.g. sugar, meat, rice) led 
to the growth of certain groups. 
  Family groups evolved, typically as a result 




Industrial holding companies emerged 
out of former Communist planning 
units, sometimes with 15-30 horizontally 
and vertically linked plants and 
subsidiaries. These companies were 
voucher-privatized and restructured 
using government subsidies. The 
remaining shares were bought at 
discount by the new management team 
and consortia of Czech banks. 
Voucher privatization led to 
the creation of large, 
diversified investment funds, 
often indirectly run by banks, 




Favored entrepreneurs formed groups 
during the License Raj of the 1960’s and 
1970’s (although other groups date back 
to the early twentieth century). This was 
despite the existence of de jure 
legislation that was anti-big business 
(e.g. the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices – MRTP – Act).  
Some entrepreneurs who 
formed groups benefited from 
the transfer of assets formerly 
held by the British to Indians 
during the Independence 
movement (de facto 
privatization). 
Clusters of business groups formed around 
ethnic, religious and social communities, 
for example, the Marwaris of Rajasthan 
formed businesses in Bengal and elsewhere; 
the Gujeratis in the West, the Chettiars in 






Some groups run by members of the 
Suharto family. Others, such as the 
Salim group, were granted monopoly 
over mills. Close government 
involvement in business. State-
sponsored cement and other monopolies 
benefited groups. 
The Salim group received 
assets seized by the army. 
Suharto viewed the involvement of his 
children in business groups as a way of 
righting the Pribumi-Chinese imbalance in 
the top ranks of the business community 
(although most groups are identified as 
ethnic-Chinese, including the state-
supported Salim group). 
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Israel 
State backing of preferred groups in the 
early decades after independence. 
Privatization – transfer of 
some government assets to 





Government credit and protection of 
some groups in early post-war years 






Preferential credit and protection from 
foreign competition to entrepreneurs 
following government guidelines, 
especially with political contacts to 
General Park. The government, through 
its control of the financial system, often 
encouraged group diversification, 
mergers and consolidation (acquisition 
of ailing firms and groups), and 
investment in certain industries. 
Sale of assets formerly 
controlled by the Japanese and 
of state assets to some favored 





Preferential credit to businessmen with 
close ties, including members of 
Mahathir’s family. Political parties 
explicitly involved in business. 
Consolidation has often been used as a 
remedy to salvage distressed firms, 
particularly by grouping companies 
under favored Malay entrepreneurs. 
Privatization (of colonial 
assets and of failed 
government investments) – 
buyers have political contacts 
and state patronage. 
President Mahatir supports Bumipeuteras 
entrepreneurs in the privatization processes. 
Some ethnic Chinese groups operate in 
Malaysia and across its borders (to diversify 
political risks).  
Mexico 
Until the mid 1980’s the government 
supported business groups by protecting 
many sectors through tariffs and trade 
restrictions, as well as by granting 
discretionary concessions (for example, 
in media, mining, and other sectors), as 
well direct and indirect subsidies to 
certain goods and industries (e.g. sugar). 
Groups also enjoyed monopolies, state-
induced consolidation and certain 
protection from FDI. Since 1973, groups 
and conglomerates have enjoyed certain 
special tax incentives. 
The privatization period 
(mostly 1988 to 1994) 
benefited many business 
groups which bought the 
national phone company (and 
was granted a monopoly for 5 
years) and banks. Some new 
groups were created following 
the privatization of the 1990’s.
Family ties are crucial for business groups 
in Mexico. The largest industrial 
conglomerates in certain regions are still 
run by the families who started the 
businesses in the mid-nineteenth century, 
often with very strong ties to the 
government. 
Nicaragua 
The government of the Somozas (father 
and son) controlled directly a large 
number of industries. At the end of the 
Sandinista government many firms were 
bankrupt and a few groups acquired 
them, leading to consolidation 
  Concentration in family groups, inherited 





Foreign exchange licenses given 
primarily to rich families. Combined 
with restrictions on imports.  
  
Russia 
Some (limited) government support of 
industry-led FIG’s which evolved with 
the collapse of Communism; much more 
support of the bank-led FIG’s which 
enjoy (enjoyed?) political clout, 
lobbying power for various privileges 
(e.g. restrictions on foreign investors), 
and influence the media. 
Industry-led financial-
industrial groups (FIG’s) 
emerged early in the 
privatization process. Bank-
led FIG’s emerged later, in 
relation to auctions initiated 
by President Yeltsin favoring 
(some) buyers; state assets 
sold at low prices to 
“Oligarchs.”  
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Singapore 
Government-linked business groups 
established in the 1960’s and 1970’s in 
order to make economic investments 
jointly with private investors. 
  Ethnic Chinese, who felt threatened by the 
government formed private, family 
controlled groups, diversifying across 
industries and borders to reduce risk. 
South 
Africa 
    During Apartheid, major groups were 
associated with the whites; In the post-
Apartheid period, the adoption of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies 
induced a transfer of assets from whites to 
blacks, and the formation of conglomerates 
by select black entrepreneurs, some of 
whom had political contacts to the ANC. 
Taiwan 
Not much government support and 
encouragement; family-groups formed 
endogenously (but benefited from 





Some groups originated in the 1940’s; 
politicians and military officers often 
involved in business groups; restricted 
competition in many sectors favors 
groups. 
  Groups are often dominated by ethnic 
Chinese, some of whom operate in 
neighboring countries as well. 
Turkey 
Between 1923 and 1980 some groups 
were supported through preferential 
input prices, low-cost credits, tax 
rebates, foreign exchange licenses, 
import licenses, government contracts, 
as well as through export-specific 
measures allowing business groups to 
establish large export companies in 
the1980’s. The government also 
encouraged diversification and 
internationalization of business groups 
via various economic incentives. (But 
several group-owned banks were taken 
over by the government after the bank 
crisis in 2001.) 
Relatively larger business 
groups are the favored 
participants in the 
privatization of state owned 
enterprises, especially those 
with strong political ties. 
Smaller family groups 
participate in the privatization 
efforts of smaller state assets. 
 
The 19
th century business elite was mostly 
composed of ethnic minorities and foreign 
investors. With the founding of the new 
Turkish Republic in 1923, the economic 
agenda stressed creating an indigenous 
business class: bureaucrats, merchants, and 






Some “political merchants” received 
state credit and grants. Ailing 
government businesses privatized and 
sold to the Zaibatsu. Government 
contracts encouraged group growth 
around major wars.  
  
 
Sources (in English): Brazil – Leff (1978), Wilson and Villela (1997), and Musacchio (2004); Chile – 
Khanna and Palepu (1999a, 2000b); China – Keister (2004); Costa Rica – private communication with 
A. Condo; Czech Republic – Mc Dermott (2002); India – Khanna and Palepu (1999a, 2000a, 2005)  
and Piramal (1998); Indonesia – Commonwealth of Australia, Chapter 8, Schwartz (1994), Kompass 
Indonesia (1996) and Fisman (2001); Israel – Maman (2002); Italy – Aganin and Volpin (2005); Korea 
– Amsden (1989), Clifford (1994) and Chang (2003a); Malaysia – Gomez and Jomo (1999) and Gomez 
(2005); Mexico - Gómez-Galvarriato  (2005); Nicaragua – Strachan (1976); Pakistan – White (1974); 
Russia – Johnson (1997) and Guriev and Rachinsky (2005); Singapore – Tsui-Auch (2005b); South 
Africa – McGregors (1998); Taiwan – Hamilton (1997) and Chung (2001); Thailand – Bertrand et al. 
(2004), Tara Siam (1996-97); Turkey – Mango (2004), Yarpak et al. (2004), and Karademir et al. 
(2005); Prewar Japan – Morikawa (1992).  
(For Latin America, a general – Spanish - source is America Economica, 1997). 
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Panel B: Group-specific Origins in 19
th Century Japan 
  




Dates back to 1673 (dry goods); “political 
merchants
40” who provided financial services 
to the Tokugawa regime since the late 17
th 
century. 
Historically close ties with various 
governments. Growth and diversification 
through acquisitions and through 
establishment of new businesses, in part 





Founded by a former Samurai after the Meiji 
Restoration. 
Initial investment in shipping enjoyed 
government protection, subsidies, loans etc. 
Subsequent growth and diversification 




Dates back to the late 16
th century, with ties to 
the Tokugawa regime. 
Diversified from mining into trading, finance 
and industry. Again, diversification and 
growth through both acquisitions and through 
the establishment of new businesses, with 
government support.  
Yasuda
* “Political merchants” from the Meiji 
Restoration period. Mainly provided financial 
services (including the establishment of the 
third national bank in 1876). 
Less diversified than the other big groups, 
more focused on banking and finance. Again, 
both acquisitions and new businesses as 
mechanisms of growth. 
Asano  Around 1870; no previous political ties.  Initial fortune out of various investments. 
Growth through cooperation with a separate 
financial institution.  
Fujita  Origin: supplier of goods and engineering 
works to the new government (with contacts 
to major figures in the Meiji government). 
An internal family feud led to the dissolution 
of this group and its reorganization as the 
Kuhara zaibatsu in 1905. 
Furukawa  Formed in 1874, related to old wealth from the 
Ono family. 
Mostly in mining and utilities, e.g. established 
the first hydroelectric power plant in 1890. 
Characterized by more vertical integration 
(e.g. in copper extraction and production) than 
diversification. 
Okura  Merchant (groceries) before the Meiji 
Restoration; converted into gun production in 
the 1860’s and then into overseas trading 
starting 1873. 
Growth mainly through acquisitions. Despite 
substantial operations overseas, government 
contracts remained a major source of income. 
 
Source: Morikawa (1992). * denotes the big four zaibatsu groups.  
 
 
                                                            
40 This refers to the Japanese term seisho which is defined by Morikawa (1992, p. 3) as “traders and 
financiers who used their ties to powerful political figures to obtain government favors, enabling them 
to earn substantial profit in return for providing goods and services to the state. Government patronage 
took the form of subsidies, grants and monopolies or special privileges, favorable credit arrangements, 
and sales of state enterprises at nominal prices.” 
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Panel C: Group-specific Origins in Present-Day Korea 
 
  Origin  Growth and Relations with the State
Hyundai 
 
Mr. Chung (the founder) started by providing 
mechanical services to the American army; 
later established contacts with the Syngman 
Rhee regime.  
Together with Daewoo, one of General Park’s 
favored groups in the 1970’s, when Hyundai 
cooperated with the government’s policy of 
investment in heavy and chemical industries. 
Obtained licenses and government finance as 
well as preferential tax treatment and 
protection from imports. Growth through both 
acquisitions and entry into new industries. 
Allegations that Hyundai and other big groups 
used government contacts to improve their 
competitive positions, occasionally by 
acquiring assets of ailing groups and by 
winning major government contracts. Mr. 
Chung was General Park’s “informal 
construction minister” and a personal friend. 
Daewoo 
 
Mr. Kim (the founder) was the son of General 
Park’s teacher. Group established in 1967.  
Close relations with the government, which 
transferred to Daewoo the Okpo shipyard and 
some assets in the auto industry previously 
owned by GM. Government-induced 
investments in heavy industry. Expansion 
mainly through acquisitions. Strong 




Mr. Lee (the founder) established the 
company in 1938, using some inherited 
wealth. Acquisition of assets left by the 
Japanese in 1945.  
Samsung was relatively large already in the 
1950’s; made political “donations” and 
established contacts in government. But 
relations with the state were turbulent in 
comparison with the other major groups: 
General Park forced Samsung to “donate” 
some of its assets soon after taking power, and 
for a while the group was virtually excluded 
from most government contracts. Instead, 
growth fostered through cooperation with 
foreign firms; relative focus on electronics. 
Growth and diversification in 1960’s through 
both acquisitions and establishment of new 
businesses.   
LG  Founded as a trading company in 1947.  Growth mostly in electronics and chemicals; 
benefited from government development plans 
in the 1960’s; related diversification strategy. 
SK  Founded in 1957; close ties with the 
government since inception. 
Much of its growth driven by acquisition of 
privatized state assets (including property left 
by the Japanese), through close ties to the 
government, including the marriage of the 
founder’s son to the daughter of President 
Roh. 
 
Source: Clifford (1994) and Chang (2003a).
  84    
Table V: Studies on Business Groups in Korea 












Category  Main Argument, Sample 









Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
Business groups with multidivisional 
structure show superior economic 
performance because of reduced 
transaction costs. 63 group affiliated 












Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
Internal capital markets in the chaebol 
alleviate financing constraints, but are 
associated with inefficient allocation of 
funds. 
123 group affiliated firms and 194 












Groups as diversified 
entities  
 
Group firms exhibited relatively low 
profit rates before 1989; firms affiliated 
with the largest groups appear to have 
somewhat higher growth rates and 
lower variation in profit rates compared 
with unaffiliated firms. 91 group 
















Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
Group firms benefit from group 
membership through sharing intangible 
and financial resources with other 
member firms. Various forms of 
internal business transactions, such as 
debt guarantees, equity investments and 
internal trade are extensively used for 
the purpose of cross-subsidization. 
1,248 companies, associated with 317 














When a chaebol-affiliated firm makes 
an acquisition its stock price typically 
falls. Minority shareholders of the 
acquiring firm lose, but controlling 
shareholders benefit because the 
acquisition enhances the value of other 
firms in the group. Consistent with 
















Corporate governance problems among 
the top chaebol may have exacerbated 
the recent financial crisis. 356 firms, 














Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
Business groups play an important role 
in developing countries by 
circumventing market inefficiencies; 
these effects tend to be smaller in large 
business groups, and to decrease over 
time. 1666 companies affiliated with 




















Tunneling by controlling shareholders 
when their cash flow rights are low. 

















Category  Main Argument, Sample 













Performance during crisis is related to 
agency problems. 
590 firms, May 1997- August 1998. 
Kim and Lee 
(2003) 
Reference to 







Groups as diversified 
entities 
 
Chaebol-affiliated firms suffer loss of 
value relative to non-affiliated firms. This 
may be due to: (1) pursuit of profit 
stability rather than profit maximization; 
(2) over-investment in low performing 
industries; (3) cross-subsidization of 
weaker members of their group. 759 
chaebol firm-year observations and 1,316 
independent firm-year observations, 
1990-1995. 




















Change in firm value during crisis is a 
function of firm-level differences in 
corporate governance measures. 644 















yes  Corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
Simultaneous nature of relationship 
between ownership structure and 
performance in a sample of group 
affiliated public firms. Performance 
determines ownership structure but not 
vice versa: controlling shareholders use 
insider information to increase their direct 
and indirect equity stakes in more 
profitable firms and transfer profits to 
other affiliates through intra-group trade. 















Groups as diversified 
entities + corporate 
governance/pyramids/ 
tunneling 
Highly leveraged groups with a high 
proportion of non-manufacturing business 
tend to have direct ownership. Larger 
groups with a high proportion of non-
voting shares tend to have pyramidal 
structure. Groups with focused business 
lines tend to have larger family stakes. 
669 firms, 1995. 
Lim and Kim 
(2005) 
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